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U.S. support for border enforcement in Mexico has been ongoing for decades, but 
after the arrival of unprecedented numbers of Central American minors and families in 
the U.S. Southwest in 2014, greater pressure was placed on Mexico to seal its border with 
Guatemala. This thesis explores the resulting tensions between the latest Mexican border 
enforcement policies, intended to tighten security and surveillance especially in the south 
of the country, and the relatively new (2011) Migration Law, intended to facilitate the 
protection of migrants’ rights. Drawing on critical discourse analysis as well as a feminist 
geopolitical approach to ethnography, this thesis looks at the ways that the boundaries of 
the Mexican state are maintained through both infrastructural and administrative barriers, 
resulting in the creation of marginal spaces where migrants are simultaneously included 
and excluded from state protection. Importantly, this thesis finds that the state margins, 
while often the sites of neglect, exploitation, and exception, also serve as sites of creative 
resistance, where alternative geographies are developed. In some instances, as during the 
summer of 2016 in Oaxaca, Mexico, resistance in separate marginal spaces overlaps, 
 vi 
generating opportunities for migrants’ increased mobility in the southern border region. 
In conclusion, this thesis calls for a reexamination of the ways that migrants’ rights are 
upheld, and maintains that threads of accountability must be traced between local, 
national and international actors.  
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Chapter I: Introduction  
U.S. support for border enforcement in Mexico has been ongoing for decades, but 
after the arrival of unprecedented numbers of Central American minors and families in 
the U.S. Southwest in 2014, greater pressure was placed on Mexico to seal its border with 
Guatemala. While overall migration to the United States has decreased to early 1970s 
levels and migration from Mexico specifically has dropped considerably,1 migration from 
the Northern Triangle countries – Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador – has steadily 
risen (Gonzalez-Barrera 2015). From to 2011 to 2014, the number of apprehensions of 
unaccompanied minors from these countries multiplied more than tenfold, peaking in 
2014 at over 51,705, a 248% increase from the previous year (US. CBP 2017; WOLA 
2016). The number of families from the Northern Triangle crossing the U.S. border has 
also increased in recent years, a trend that migration experts expect to remain constant so 
long as high rates of violence and unemployment persist in their home countries (Beltrán 
2016).  
As media coverage of this phenomenon has increased, the U.S. has placed greater 
pressure on Mexico to seal its southern border, the entry point into the final and most 
arduous leg of migrants’ path north. At the same time, international and local human 
rights organizations have pressured the Mexican government to pursue border 
enforcement strategies that ensure migrants’ rights, thus opening potential avenues for 
safe passage through the country. Both projects have fallen under the umbrella of 
                                                 
1 From 2009 to 2014, there has been a net loss of 140,000 people migrating to the US from Mexico. For 
more, see U.S. CBP 2016 and Gonzalez-Barrera 2015. 
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Programa Frontera Sur, announced on July 7, 2014 by President Peña Nieto, drawing on 
U.S. funding through the Mérida Initiative to “order” Mexico’s southern border (Wilson 
& Valenzuela 2014). The contradiction apparent in these conflicting agendas – the 
securitization of the border through increased policing and surveillance on the one hand, 
and the protection of migrants’ rights through state institutions on the other – results in 
the production of a landscape of uncertainty for those attempting to safely cross nation-
state lines.2  
As many scholars and journalists have already shown, the undocumented journey 
through Mexico is more dangerous and lengthy than ever before (de Leon 2015; Martínez 
2014; Vogt 2013). What has been less documented is how migrants, in pursuit of 
protected legal status and access to justice within the country, remain in the margins of 
the nation-state, never fully incorporated nor absolutely excluded from its boundaries. By 
investigating how migrants navigate the infrastructure and administration of border 
enforcement in southern Mexico, this thesis attempts to expose how nation-state policies 
and international security agreements are experienced in the everyday. In studying the 
state from the perspective of the margins -- from places of exclusion, expulsion, 
exploitation and neglect -- I endeavor to bring attention to the ways that the strict lines of 
official policy become blurred, producing spaces of precarity and exception in the 
extended border zone.  
                                                 
2 For more on the contradictions apparent in the implementation of Mexico’s progressive migration 
policies among Central American residents in southern Mexico, see Carte 2014. 
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To pursue this route of inquiry, this thesis sets out to achieve the following 
objectives: 1) to trace the discursive and material making of the borderlands in southern 
Mexico; 2) to map migrants’ experiences navigating border enforcement and immigration 
administration against the official state narratives, exposing points of intersection and 
contradiction across scales; 3) to observe the ways that alternative geographies are 
creatively produced in the margins by migrants, both in response to state border 
enforcement and administrative practices as well as in unintended correspondence with 
other marginalized populations’ resistance of state intervention.  
I conducted fieldwork in Oaxaca City, Oaxaca, Mexico from June 2016 to August 
2016, totaling eight weeks of research. Volunteering at a migrant shelter in the capital of 
Oaxaca state, I used participant observation and ethnographic research methods to gather 
stories from both migrants and migrant advocates to learn about recent shifts in the 
border enforcement landscape of southern Mexico. Through engagement in the everyday 
functioning of this transit space, I learned how migrants’ mobility is constrained and 
negotiated through direct contact with state institutions, as well as through its evasion.  
Over the course of my fieldwork, I observed how the history and politics of 
Oaxaca and the southern border region in general also impacted migrants’ mobility and 
state border enforcement practices in unforeseen ways. Taking this into account, this 
thesis incorporates analysis of how local social movements inadvertently impacted 
migrants’ journeys during the summer of 2016. While not the main focus of my research, 
attention to the surrounding political context helps to demonstrate how different scales 
and systems of marginality intersect in complex ways. In some instances, these 
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intersections open up more space for creativity in the margins, forging alternative 
geographies and connecting differently situated subjects who share disenfranchised 
positionings in global neoliberal processes.  
This study also employs critical discourse analysis to identify and interpret 
official state narratives concerning recent border enforcement strategies in southern 
Mexico, grouped together under the Programa Frontera Sur (PFS, the Southern Border 
Program). Looking both at the physical infrastructure recently updated or constructed in 
the southern border region as well as at the state’s official statements surrounding its 
intended purpose, this macro-level analysis examines the state’s performance of 
sovereignty both in relation to its control of transnational flows of goods and people, as 
well as its distinction from its northern neighbor. These official border narratives are later 
drawn upon as points of comparison with migrants’ everyday experiences, connecting 
and contrasting geopolitics across scales.   
The following sections of this chapter outline my feminist geopolitical approach, 
conceptualization of the state and its margins, including the theoretical themes to be later 
discussed. I conclude this chapter introducing my field research methods, study site and 
my positionality as a U.S.-based academic conducting fieldwork in Mexico. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FEMINIST GEOPOLITICS 
 
 This research follows a feminist geopolitical theoretical approach, connecting 
state-level discourse to the practices and encounters of the everyday (Dixon & Marston 
2011; Dowler & Sharp 2001; Hyndman 2004; Hyndman 2001). In doing so, it breaches 
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binary conceptual divisions between the global and the local, and inverts discursive 
hierarchies that privilege state-level politics as the preferred sites of analysis over the 
mundane experience.  
A feminist geopolitical approach to studying the state calls for attention not only 
to government policies and institutions, but also to the finest scale of analysis, that of the 
body, as a means to uncover differences in perspective as well as experience. Embodied 
difference often determines mobility within state systems. As Hyndman and de Alwis 
(2005) observe in their study of mobility and displacement in Sri Lanka, bodies are read 
and policed according to various axes of identity. Such attention to embodiment 
recognizes that difference is constructed in complex ways, often at the intersection of 
race, class, gender, sex, nationality, ethnicity, and religion, but also in relation to place. 
Awareness of the spatialities of power and difference help to locate subjects within 
shifting landscapes of identity and meaning. For instance, as Hyndman and de Alwis 
write (2005, 29), “one is never just a woman, but is always a woman from somewhere…”  
Attention to embodied difference can also help to situate knowledge produced by 
informants and researchers. It acknowledges partiality in our perspective, and thus 
encourages the weaving of “webs of connection” to “join with another, to see together” 
and to create knowledge collectively (Haraway 1991, 191, 195). Furthermore, attention to 
embodied experience exposes the relationship between the material and discursive 
aspects of geopolitics, and thus “enables feminist geopolitical analyses to be more than 
critical practice or armchair theorising” in its epistemological assertion that discourse 
impacts and is shaped by bodies on the ground (Williams & Massaro 2013, 754). It 
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requires an ethic of care that is sensitive to material realities and encourages collaborative 
practices with actors outside of academia (Dixon & Marston 2011; Ehrkamp 2011).  
Looking beyond the discipline of geography, I also draw on the work of 
anthropologists who similarly investigate the state in its everyday practice. In their edited 
compilation Anthropology in the Margins of the State, Veena Das and Deborah Poole call 
for ethnographers of the state to “return to the ordinary,” exploring the mundane 
moments that “shift our gaze from the obvious places in which power is expected to 
reside to the margins and recesses of everyday life” (Das & Poole 2004, 30; Das 2007, 
169). Like feminist geopolitical geographers, Das, Poole, and other contributors to their 
compilation ground their research in the everyday, opting for methods that require 
anthropologists to visit the margins of the state to observe the state’s practices and direct 
encounters with the people who live there. The margins of the state are conceived as 
“peripheries seen to form natural containers for people considered insufficiently 
socialized into the law” (Das & Poole 2004, 9). It is in these peripheral zones, at the 
edges of state sovereignty, that the power of the law is continuously reestablished 
“through forms of violence and authority” that mark who is within and outside state 
protection (13). In this thesis, the state margins are spatial and temporal zones of 
precarity encountered along migration routes throughout southern Mexico, and include: 
movement through or around checkpoints, respite and orientation in migration shelters, 
and waiting through administrative immigration processes.  While the “forms of violence 
and authority” carried out by the state in the margins vary, in this thesis, they tend to 
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center on moments of neglect, abandonment and lack of protection for migrants (Das & 
Poole 2004, 13).   
Conceptualization of the State 
 
In order to follow these scholars’ lead in conducting an ethnography of the state 
from the margins, the state must be theorized. Numerous scholars have used the work of 
Giorgio Agamben to locate the position of undocumented migrants in relation to the state 
(García Aguilar 2011; Mountz 2010, 2011; Secor 2007). Central to Agamben’s thesis is 
the figure of homo sacer, the person who has only bare life and “may be killed and yet 
not sacrificed” (Agamben 1995, 12). The homo sacer is both within and outside the 
boundaries of the state, simultaneously subjected to its laws and excluded from full 
protection. Das and Poole write, “homo sacer’s life is ‘bare’ because it can be taken by 
anyone without any mediation from law and without incurring the guilt of homicide” 
(Das & Poole 2004, 11). The homo sacer exists in a state of exception, a precarious 
marginality that also undergirds state sovereignty:  
….because the sovereign cannot by definition be bound to the law, the 
political community itself becomes split along the different axes of 
membership and inclusion that may run along given fault lines of race, 
gender, and ethnicity of people, included in the political community but 
denied membership in political terms (Das & Poole 2004, 12).   
 
While Das and Poole agree that it is through the production of disposable, killable bodies 
that the state continuously establishes its power, they differ from Agamben in their 
assertion that these constitutions of power through violence are not “ghostly spectral 
presences from the past” but rather are “embedded in everyday life in the present” (Das 
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& Poole 2004, 13). In other words, the production of disposable bodies is not established 
in the law alone, but also in ordinary, embodied encounters with the state. 
 Alison Mountz agrees with this critique, and goes on to point out that Agamben’s 
lack of attention to embodiment homogenizes the experience of excluded populations. 
She writes that Agamben’s homo sacer is an “undifferentiated, gender-blind, unspecified 
body;” for Agamben, every person is potentially “always paradoxically outside the state” 
(Mountz 2011, abstract). Mountz argues that those who live in a state of exception must 
be considered as differently situated, especially in relation to the histories and identities 
they embody. Individuals often experience different treatment by the state depending on 
their age, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, or even place of encounter. By not describing 
the material particularities of different zones of exception, Agamben produces a faceless, 
universal figure that is dislocated and unidentifiable, the intimacies of their experience 
washed away. However, by locating excluded people within particular histories, 
identities, and geographies, Mountz, like Das and Poole, argues that we can better 
understand the complexities and nuances of zones of exception; by returning to the 
everyday and grounding research at the juncture of discursive-material processes, we 
might make room for concrete, political intervention. 
 Some scholars have used Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and biopolitics 
to describe the technologies of power that maintain margins (Belcher et al. 2008; Das and 
Poole 2004; Hyndman 2012; Mountz 2010). Although I do not heavily draw upon 
Foucault’s theory of power and the state in this thesis, I do refer to the article 
“Everywhere and Nowhere: The Exception and the Topological Challenge to Geography” 
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(Belcher et al. 2008), in which the authors “use analytics of governmentality, which itself 
refers to the everyday emergence of power and control, to think through how the 
exception works” (2008, 501). In this article, the exception is conceived as a “potential 
(dis) ordering principle, a potential technique of government” (2008, 501). They place 
emphasis on the uncertainty produced in such zones: the power of the exception exists in 
its perpetual transformation; it is “both capable of becoming and of not becoming” (2008, 
502). I find this conception of exceptionality useful in thinking through migrant’s 
intermittent encounters with the state, which are often characterized by uncertainty and 
precarity as their status as shifts from place to place or moment to moment.  
 Mountz might argue that this approach, which suggests strategic and systematic 
exclusion of certain populations through networked technologies of power, risks 
portraying the state as a “mysterious institution so powerful as to remain abstract and 
wholly detached from everyday lives” (Mountz 2010, xxxii). By locating and embodying 
the state in its “daily interactions with citizens and others,” the state no longer appears 
monolithic, magical and impossible to penetrate and alter (Mountz 2010, xxxii). Mountz 
is right to emphasize the state’s material distortions and heterogeneity across space and 
scales; her research deconstructs the state as an all-powerful and coherent institution by 
looking at the ways individual government officials, as socialized subjects, and specific 
agencies, as distinct cultural communities, establish the boundaries of the state in distinct 
ways. When represented only in disembodied form, the state might be perceived as an 
omniscient presence, thus growing more powerful.  
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On the other hand, the state does not exist exclusively in material and embodied 
form. As Talal Asad contends, the concept of the state, imagined both at its center and its 
margins, has significant power: “the abstract structure of the state… is the essential 
condition for the exercise of specific kinds of legal power...Abstractions are inevitably 
used in everyday discourse, and they inform our daily practices” (Asad 2004, 282). Along 
these lines, Das theorizes the state as “neither a purely rational-bureaucratic organization 
nor simply a fetish [an empty, ideological construction], but as a form of regulation that 
oscillates between a rational mode and a magical mode of being” (Das 2004, 225). This 
“magical mode of being” is partially enacted through the state’s illegibility, its 
perpetuation of ambiguity and inconsistency. While Mountz might attribute this 
illegibility to the haphazard nature of bureaucracies -- their misunderstandings and 
conflicting agendas -- Das sees this oscillation and intermittent contact as part of the 
state’s logic. Her analysis fits with the topologies discussed in Belcher, et al.’s article: the 
constant shifting, re-articulating, appearing and disappearing of the state of exception 
function as techniques of control, maintaining the margins through uncertainty. In my 
thesis, I argue that the reality exists between these two positions: the state is both a 
conglomerate of embodied, flawed, contradictory institutions and individuals, and an 
abstract, networked system whose inconsistencies work to marginalize certain 
populations.  
 Central to theories of the state is concept of sovereignty. Some scholars have 
argued that in today’s globalized, neoliberal era, nation-state sovereignty has waned 
(Brown 2014; Harvey 2005; Sassen 2014). The coerced enforcement of Mexico’s 
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southern border does raise important questions concerning the country’s sovereignty on 
several fronts, including its asymmetrical relationship with the United States (García 
Aguilar 2011; Villafuerte Solís 2011), as well as its facilitation and prohibition of various 
types of transnational flows (Brown 2014; Paley 2014).3 While these are important 
questions to investigate, this thesis focuses less on the matter of state sovereignty itself, 
and more on its performance of sovereignty, which discursively shapes everyday 
interactions with its institutions on the ground. To do this, I refer to Wendy Brown’s 
(2014) Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, analyzing the Mexican government’s official 
narratives of border enforcement as performances of its territorial control, which serves 
as the basis for establishing legitimacy as a nation-state.  
Conceptualization of State Margins 
 
 In the margins, the state “sees and performs itself to be seen strategically” 
(Mountz 2010, xxxi). Even when state practices are visible to those residing in margins, 
they are often illegible, opaque and inaccessible to their audiences. Talal Asad theorizes 
that margins might be imagined “as spaces, forms, and practices through which the state 
is continually both experienced and undone through the illegibility of its own practices, 
documents, and words” (Asad 2004, 279, emphasis added). Similarly, Das and Poole 
observe that the obscured practices of the state are techniques of governance, keeping 
                                                 
3 The sovereignty and recognition of the nation-state, established in the Treaty of Westphalia, hinges on 
authority and control over a certain territory. Without this control, the legitimacy of the ruling body 
claiming sovereignty over the territory would be diminished. For this reason, the “illegal” flows through the 
border regions –in the U.S., Mexico, and elsewhere – are perceived as the undermining of the governing 
body’s legitimacy as a sovereign actor. For more on the legitimacy of sovereignty of the nation-state, see 
Brown 2014, De Genova & Peutz 2010, and Hurd 1999.  
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certain citizens in the margins by forcing them through lengthy or confusing legal 
processes, or by coopting authority of the written law to consolidate local governing 
power (Das 2004, 2007; Poole 2004). At times, the state and its practices are hyper 
visible; at other times they are hidden. Conflicting narratives are produced through such 
inconsistencies and intermittent contact. This thesis contends that the oscillating visibility 
and legibility of the state keeps migrants in zones of uncertainty, their safety and rights 
never fully ensured by the state.  
 In order to navigate these ambiguous borderlands, migrants also use visibility as a 
tactic to safely move through surveillanced territory, strategically making their narratives 
legible to the state in opportune moments and safe spaces. Their choices to follow 
informal or formal paths demonstrate how agency persists in landscapes of uncertainty, 
actively generating alternative geographies for mobility in the margins of the state.4 Local 
advocates are essential links in the chain of communication between state officials and 
migrants; their knowledge of the state’s immigration administration and legal 
infrastructure, as well as their relationships with state officials facilitate and legitimate 
migrants’ claims to state protection. These intermediary advocates are often located in 
migrant shelters, which serve as spaces of refuge as well as orientation for those 
journeying north.  
 In this thesis, I conceptualize margins as both spatial and temporal zones that 
reflect the exceptionality of the state. This is consistent with Mountz’s analysis that, for 
those seeking protected status or access to their legal rights, “temporality is often 
                                                 
4 For more on migration mobility and agency, see Ashutosh & Mountz 2012.  
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conceptualized as waiting, limbo or suspension” (Mountz 2011, abstract). In reference to 
asylum seekers’ legal journeys, she writes that “the suspension of time maps onto 
corresponding spatial ambiguity theorized often as liminality, zone of exception or 
threshold between states” (Mountz 2011, 93-94). In their descriptions of moving through 
the Regularización Humanitaria process,5 many migrants with whom I spoke similarly 
emphasized the uncertainty produced in waiting for temporary visitor status in Mexico. 
This temporal liminality corresponded with a spatial marginality that migrants 
experienced en route or in shelters. 
 Albergues (migrant shelters) and migration routes have been studied by a number 
of anthropologist ethnographers, including Susan Coutin (2005), Wendy Vogt (2013), 
and Christine Kovic (2008). Although they do not use the concepts exceptionality or 
margins to describe the relationship of these spaces to the state, they do locate albergues 
at the edges and intersections of various systems.  
Coutin (2005) uses the concept of clandestinity to describe migrants’ 
simultaneous presence and absence en route to the United States: their journeys are 
“hidden, yet known;” because “their presence is prohibited, unauthorized migrants do not 
fully arrive even when they reach their destinations” (Coutin 2005, 196). She notes how 
migrant shelters also make up part of this clandestine geography, constructed along 
migrant travel routes. Coutin’s observation points to the use of migrant shelters as 
                                                 
5 This immigration process, officially called Regularización por Razones Humanitarias, offers temporary 
visitor status to victims of grave crimes that occurred within Mexican territory, regardless of the victim’s 
means of entry into the country. Regularización Humanitaria, as I refer to it throughout this thesis, will be 
described in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3. For more, see 
http://www.inm.gob.mx/static/Tramites/regularizacion/Por_razones_humanitarias.pdf . 
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meeting points -- not only between journeying bodies, but also between formal and 
informal cartographies, where the clandestine and official mappings overlap.  
Wendy Vogt also describes albergues as spaces of juncture, focusing especially 
on commercial processes that develop there. She investigates the penetration of neoliberal 
practices into migration journeys through Mexico, and observes that, in addition to 
serving as “the base for much of the migrant-rights movement,” shelters “have become 
incorporated into zones of profit” where guides can recruit potential clients (Vogt 2013). 
Similarly, in her study of risk and migration in post-NAFTA southern Mexico, Christine 
Kovic also locates albergues in southern Mexico as spaces of juncture; for her, they are 
spaces of intersection of international human rights and neoliberal policy agendas (2008). 
Connecting global and local injustices, she argues for a decolonial approach to studying 
the violence of migration, situating migrants’ narratives within political-economic 
processes functioning at other scales.  
Like these ethnographers, I understand albergues to be spaces of intersection, 
overlap, and opening, as they facilitate activities and discourses that operate formally and 
informally, on multiple scales. The albergues which I studied are church-run, and are 
funded mostly through parish donations. They exist at the threshold of state inclusion and 
materially manifest marginality: the state cooperates with them even though that 
cooperation would seem to contradict border enforcement practices elsewhere. Both 
inside and outside the law, albergues exhibit exceptionality, precariously placed within a 
permitted clandestinity.  
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This thesis looks at migrant shelters both as spaces of legibility (a two-way 
process between migrants and the state), and as spaces of creativity and resistance, where 
migrants develop and share alternative geographies to navigate state boundaries. It is not 
surprising that margins, flowing outside of state control even as they are partially 
contained within it, are also spaces where “alternative forms of political action are 
instituted” (Das & Poole 2004, 19). In the case of undocumented transmigrants in 
Mexico’s southern border region, this form of political action could be continuing the 
journey north, moving off official maps and making creative use of the available spaces 
and routes. Migrants’ paths often shift in relation to expanded border enforcement, 
available shelter, and transportation options (Casillas 2008). Their choices in navigating 
border administration and infrastructure demonstrates how individual agency and 
resistance to statist structuring persist, even (or especially) in the state’s margins.  
On a regional level, the relative marginality of southern Mexico has also produced 
alternative geographies that overlap with migrants’ routes in unique ways. Over the 
summer of 2016, actions taken by local social movements in Oaxaca coincidentally 
provided openings for migrants’ increased mobility. Looking at the examples like the 
CNTE (Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, National Coordination 
of Education Workers) teachers’ union protests, this thesis explores how marginal spaces 
and regions interact across scales, disrupting state practices in unexpected ways, creating 





 A feminist geopolitical approach to studying state practices calls for the 
production of embodied knowledge, collaboratively encountered in day-to-day 
experiences at the margins of the state. To do this, Williams and Massaro observe that 
many feminist geopolitical geographers choose to use “situated, embodied 
methodologies,” including ethnography and participant observation (Williams & Massaro 
2013, 752). Anthropologists Das and Poole also see ethnography as one of the best suited 
tools for this task, as it delves “into the realms of the social that are not easily discernible 
within more formal protocols used by many other disciplines” (Das & Poole 2004, 30).  
In her investigation of state border enforcement practices and their impact on 
offshore asylum seekers, Mountz conducted an ethnography of the state that “uncovers 
the operation of power at multiple scales and centers,” focusing attention both on the 
state -- specifically, the bureaucracies that administer immigration policies in Canada--, 
and on the state’s margins, listening to the stories of asylum seekers and migrants who 
encounter the state in situations of precarity (Mountz 2010, xxiii). For Mountz, this multi-
perspective ethnographic approach is essential to her project of demystifying and re-
embodying the state, making its conflicts and contradictions visible by peopling its 
otherwise opaque processes.  
Due to time constraints and issues of access, I did not adopt Mountz’s method in 
its entirety, but chose to focus mostly on the “effects of governance, the idea of the state 
and its reproduction and enactment on the ground,” as told in the narratives of migrants 
and migrant advocates who often mediate state encounters in Oaxaca, Mexico (Mountz 
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2010, 149). This methodological approach aligns with that of Das and Poole, who also 
use ethnography to “undo the state at its territorial and conceptual margins,” rather than 
from its center (Das & Poole 2004, 30).  
 As a component of my ethnographic work, I used participant observation in order 
to generate collaboratively constructed, embodied knowledge that pays attention to place 
as well as position (detailed further in Chapter 3). This method of research “provides 
insights into the unwritten rules and complex interaction… often missed by other 
methods” (McMorran 2012, 493). Narratives are produced and gathered in rhythm with 
the surrounding environment, and bodies are taken seriously “as both an object of study 
and a tool through which research is conducted” (McMorran 2012, 493).  
Human geographer Jon Anderson argues that it is not only the relationships 
between bodies (researcher and respondent) that structure conversations and interactions, 
but also the relationships between bodies, landscape and memory (Anderson 2004). In 
reference to the method he developed during his fieldwork (“talking-whilst-walking”), 
Anderson observes that “meanings are sedimented in and through this processual nexus, 
[and] the physiological movement of the body through place offers the opportunity to 
literally and metaphorically ‘wander from plans to recollections to observations’ “ 
(Anderson 2004, quoting Solnit 2001, 5). These conversational wanderings take place 
between the researcher, respondent and the surroundings. Conceived of not as a 
“conventional interrogation” but rather as a “collage of collaboration,” talking-whilst-
walking and other in-situ investigative methods pay attention to people’s responsiveness 
to landscape without disrupting their rhythms. In this process, the researcher joins routine 
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activities and already-present conversations instead of re-placing investigations in a 
separate environment, which might alter the information elicited in such interactions. By 
joining respondents in their day-to-day activities, it is “possible to overcome traditional 
interviewer/interviewee power relations to forge something uniquely collaborative” 
(Anderson 2004).  
Following Anderson’s lead, I used research methods that account for the ways 
place structures the flow of thought and interaction between bodies. Taking cues from 
informal conversations that came up while I worked as a volunteer at the shelter, I was 
able to direct my research around the themes and patterns already present in the 
conversations between staff and migrants there. In this way, I focused research around 
relevant concerns and priorities of migrants and migrant advocates.  
 I also employ critical discourse analysis to examine state-level representations of 
recent changes or developments in border enforcement in southern Mexico. According to 
van Dijk, critical discourse analysis “is a type of discourse analytical research that 
primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, 
reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context…” (1998, 1). It 
is used to critique the ways “discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce or 
challenge relations of power and dominance in society” (van Dijk 1998, 3). Critical 
discourse analysis attempts to bridge the gap between everyday interactions with larger 
networks of power (van Dijk 1998, 4). Thus, by coupling critical discourse analysis with 
ethnography, this research attempts to destabilize statist representations of its 
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infrastructure and practices, introducing contrasting realities that are lived in the margins 
of the state.   
 Coinciding with other feminist methodologies, critical discourse analysis places 
importance on the body and positioning of the researcher. “[C]ritical discourse analysts 
take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose and ultimately to resist social 
inequality" (1998, 1). This method engages a mode of theorizing that does not pretend to 
have a “view from nowhere” (Haraway 1988), but rather understands that the scholar is 
necessarily entangled in a social structure and is produced through social interaction (van 
Dijk 1998, 2). It takes a critical stance towards traditional (i.e. content-analytical) 
approaches that do not acknowledge the position of the researcher as influential in the 
interpretation of the discourse, thereby perpetuating racist, classist, sexist and/or 
xenophobic stereotypes in interpretation.  
 However, I have found that positioning myself in relation to research participants 
and the field site in general is not a simple process. In agreement with Rose (1997), I 
acknowledge that a merely “transparent reflexivity” that assumes identity and position is 
fixed and knowable perpetuates the illusion of stagnant subjects that do not shift in their 
relationality. “Instead, research [might be] seen as constitutive (if not completely so), 
both of the researcher and of the other involved in the research process” (Rose 1997, 
315). The practice of positioning is always uncertain and incomplete; positions shift over 
time, between bodies, and from place to place. Despite this blurred vision of self and 
other, it is still important to acknowledge how identity could, from an incomplete vantage 
point, position the researcher and researched in relation to one another. In the following 
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section, I outline how my research design developed over time, and how my presumed 
“situatedness” might have varied from encounter to encounter and across space.  
RESEARCH SITE AND POSITIONALITY 
 
From June 2016 to August 2016, I conducted research as a participant observer at 
a migrant shelter in Oaxaca City, Oaxaca, Mexico, working as a volunteer. I developed 
my research objectives and questions through informal conversations and everyday 
activities in the shelter. I also conducted in situ, semi-structured interviews with several 
migrants and migrant advocates, both in the shelter and from the surrounding community, 
in order to learn more about changes in border enforcement practices over time. With 
approval from the IRB of the University of Texas at Austin, to protect the safety of 
migrants and migrant advocates, no names or specific identifying information was 
gathered. As an ethnography of the state from the margins, interviews do not focus on 
complete personal narratives so much as they do on encounters with the state, at the 
shelter and in the migration journey. Themes in our conversations included the difficulty 
of traveling from the southern Mexican border to the albergue, their experience moving 
through administrative processes to receive temporary visitor status in Mexico, and their 
doubts or hesitations on whether to continue their journeys north, to stay in Mexico or to 
return to their home countries. 
 When first designing my research, I had originally planned to investigate the 
gendered differences in migrating through an increasingly militarized border landscape, 
focusing especially on ways of coping with the threat of gendered violence en route. 
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However, upon arriving at the field site it became clear that there were very few migrant 
women staying at the shelter regularly -- one woman arrived for every ten men --, a 
pattern that differed from broader trends indicating Central American women’s increased 
migration to the United States.6 There were many days when no women-identifying 
migrants were present, thus making a gendered analysis of migration difficult to carry 
out. Furthermore, because most migrants stayed at the shelter for no more than three days 
at a time, to me it did not seem possible to build enough rapport to talk about the most 
difficult -- potentially traumatic -- aspects of their journey, such as coping with threat of 
gendered violence. In light of these limitations, I chose to redirect my research around 
issues and concerns that emerged in casual conversations at the shelter, which tended to 
focus less on violence already experienced en route and more on the everyday difficulties 
of moving further ahead.  
My volunteer duties shifted during my time researching at the shelter, and often 
depended on the number of migrants present, the events scheduled that week, and 
(sometimes) the level of political turbulence in the region. When I first arrived in June 
2016, there were very few migrants staying there, and my main volunteer duty was to 
accompany shelter staff and migrants to the Mercado de Abastos, the largest market in 
the city, to ask for food donations for the week (described at greater length in Chapter 3). 
Upon returning to the shelter, we would separate and organize produce together in the 
kitchen, while others cleaned and cooked. Much like Chris McMorran’s (2012) 
                                                 
6 Shelter workers did confirm that the number of women traveling through this albergue had increased in 
recent years, even if the number was low in comparison with more general trends of Central American 
women’s migration through Mexico. 
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description of his “working participant observation” research method, these weekly walks 
to and through the market were one of the best opportunities to get to know people 
staying at the shelter.  
From time to time, groups of university students or other foreign solidarity groups 
would visit the shelter for a day and I would be asked to help translate during their visits. 
It was common that staff and migrants would share their personal histories and migration 
experiences during formal presentations given to these groups. These presentations were 
reminiscent of testimonios, “urgent oral accounts bearing witness to wrongs committed 
against the speakers” (Stephen 2011). Speakers would offer personal narratives of their 
flight from violence or corruption in their home countries and abuse they endured en 
route to the shelter, sometimes at the hands of Mexican authorities.  
When there were no visitors, my work routine varied from day to day. I was asked 
to organize the bodega, where they kept clothes, backpacks, shoes, blankets and other 
donations, and occasionally translated documents for the shelter office. I also developed a 
large directory of migrant assistance services in the U.S, intended to link migrants with 
helpful organizations in their prospective destinations, and put together a pocket-sized 
pamphlet of migrants’ rights in the U.S. 
 While I remain uncertain of the particularities of others’ perceptions and reception 
of my involvement in the shelter, I am certain that my positioning as a mostly white, 
U.S.-based academic shaped the conversations and dynamics between myself, migrants, 
shelter staff, and other advocates around Oaxaca City. For instance, upon my first visit to 
the shelter in March 2016, I was abruptly confronted with the sharp difference in my 
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experience from the majority of people I met in the field site. Although already acutely 
aware of my relative socio-political power as an educated gringa, the point was driven 
home in a conversation I had with two men migrating to the U.S. from Guatemala. One 
of the men had lived in the U.S. for a number of years and was traveling back after being 
deported; the other man, younger than the first, was migrating across borders for the first 
time. They were both headed to North Dakota. The younger man asked me how long it 
had taken me to get to Oaxaca from Texas. Without thinking much, I counted the hours 
out loud: one and a half hour drive from Austin to San Antonio, a four hour flight from 
San Antonio to Mexico City, with a layover in Monterrey, and another one hour flight 
from Mexico City to Oaxaca, totaling six and a half hours to move from the south of the 
U.S. to the south of Mexico.  
The absurdity of the asymmetry of our mobility struck me in this moment, as they 
joked about hiding themselves in my luggage on the return flight. While their journey 
would last days, weeks, or possibly months, mine lasted roughly a quarter of a day. For 
me, moving across borders is as easy as buying a plane ticket and flashing my passport at 
customs; for them, it might involve thousands of dollars in coyote costs, physical 
exhaustion and the risk of losing their lives. It reminded me of Doreen Massey’s 
observation that “different social groups have distinct relationships to this anyway 
differentiated mobility: some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate 
flows and movement, others don’t; some are more on the receiving-end of it than others; 
some are effectively imprisoned by it” (Massey 1994, 3). Although cognitively aware of 
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these severe differences in experience before arriving in Oaxaca, in this moment I 
embodied that knowledge in new ways.  
I was clearly an outsider in the shelter, but my presence was not out of the 
ordinary or even unexpected for shelter staff or migrants. Several people staying there 
mentioned that they had met volunteers like me at other albergues: some from Germany, 
others from Spain and others still from central or northern Mexico. One person asked me 
if I was a journalist -- he had been interviewed by foreign reporters while riding trains 
further south -- but when I explained that I was a student researcher, he didn’t seem very 
surprised. These interactions revealed my position among many other young and foreign 
volunteers, journalists and researchers who have become common features in the Mexico 
transmigration network. As such, I assumed an identity that had already accumulated 
associations -- some negative, some positive -- due to the precedent set by others 
conducting parallel work. 
My gender identity did allow me to better establish connections with women at 
the shelter in part because, as a woman, I was permitted to enter their dormitory. I would 
regularly introduce myself to the few women staying there, and offered them information 
about migrants’ rights and protections upon entering the U.S., knowledge I had gleaned 
from my previous work experience as an immigrant’s rights paralegal in the United 
States. I made this information available to everyone at the shelter, but had more 
opportunities to share it with women who tended to remain at the shelter with their kids 
while others left to work for the day. In effect, I drew upon knowledge obtained through 
my difference as a way to offer something concrete and immediately useful (in contrast to 
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the abstract utility of the future results of this investigation). Sometimes people staying at 
the shelter wanted to chat for hours, sometimes they preferred not to, for reasons that 
partially, but not exclusively, could be tied to my identity. 
Migrants at the shelter were not homogeneous in terms of race, ethnicity or class. 
Some people were indigenous; most people were mestizo; a few had a güero/güera 
appearance (light skin, blue eyes), others were Afro-descendent, and one man identified 
as Garifuna. Officially, the albergue also offered refuge to Mexicans migrating within the 
country or heading to the U.S., although their presence at the shelter was very rare. The 
people staying at the shelters had formerly worked as government administrators, 
business owners, taxi drivers, military soldiers, students, musicians, and pandilleros 
(people affiliated with a gang). Their experiences and identities varied greatly. 
In this context of diversity, I did not stand out as severely as I did elsewhere in the 
city, which has one of the highest densities of indigenous peoples in the country (32% of 
city residents speak an indigenous language, compared to 7% of the national population) 
(INEGI 2016). At the shelter, it was sometimes assumed I was from another part of 
Mexico or Latin America until I explained otherwise (or until they heard my accented 
Spanish). Elsewhere in the city, it was immediately apparent that I was not from there. 
The significance of my positioning as a U.S.-based volunteer and researcher 
shifted in encounters with people I met outside the shelter. In the albergue I assumed an 
identity that was somewhat ordinary and expected; however, elsewhere in the city, my 
outsider positioning was defined in contrast to whom I was presumed to be. Although 
there are many foreigners from all over the world in Oaxaca’s capital, I did not fit the 
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typical profile of tourist or ex-pat artist (of which there are many). Upon learning about 
my work as a student researcher of migration, many locals seemed confused or surprised 
-- few of them even knew about the migrant shelter located in their city. Some mentioned 
that they had family members who had crossed the US-Mexico border; others voiced 
their support of the work, which they deemed to be important; a few responded in silence, 
perhaps hinting at the heaviness of the topic and its history in Oaxaca (Stephen 2007; 
Van Ramshorst 2014).  
These latter encounters often led me to question my involvement in migration 
issues outside of my home country -- why not study the enforcement of the U.S. border? 
Why travel abroad to study a practice that is just as problematic in my home state of 
Texas? As a result of struggling with these questions, this thesis attempts to trace lines of 
accountability between practices on the ground and international security agreements, 
paying attention to the ways that the U.S. has influenced immigration policy in Mexico. 
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
 This thesis is organized into five chapters, which move between analysis of 
official state discourse concerning the 2011 Migration Law and Programa Frontera Sur, 
and migrant and migrant-advocate reflections on border navigation in southern Mexico. 
In Chapter 2, I use critical discourse analysis to examine state-level representations of 
changes in immigration administration and border enforcement, focusing especially on 
the latest stream of border policies under Programa Frontera Sur. This chapter examines 
statements made by politicians involved in the administration of border policy, the 
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construction and spatial arrangement of new border infrastructure, and the legal 
structuring of migration and border enforcement in Mexico. Drawing on the work of 
Wendy Brown, I argue that Mexico’s official border narrative is defined in 
contradistinction to that of the United States, despite the two countries’ increased 
collaboration. As an examination of discourse at the “center” of the 2011 Migration Law 
and Programa Frontera Sur, this chapter serves as a point of comparison for the 
subsequent chapters’ study of the state’s margins, exposing moments of intersection and 
contradiction between official narratives and migrants’ lived experiences.   
 In Chapter 3, I draw on my ethnographic fieldwork to examine how the state is 
encountered and experienced both in administration of immigration policy and in 
navigating border enforcement infrastructure. Following the work of Das, Poole and 
Mountz, it argues that in its margins the state strategically uses visibility and illegibility to 
confuse and exhaust migrants who attempt to navigate through its legal and 
infrastructural networks. According to official state narratives (described in Chapter 2), 
migrants are afforded certain rights and protections that might be used to safely move 
through the region; however, as made evident in this research of migrants’ everyday 
engagements with the state, they are perpetually kept in zones of uncertainty and 
exception.  
 These zones of uncertainty overlap with spaces of creativity, where migrants 
exercise their agency as they generate alternative mappings of increased mobility. In 
Chapter 4, I discuss the ways that albergues serve as points of intersection between 
official and unofficial geographies, serving as a liminal space that migrants creatively use 
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to move in and outside the state’s line of sight. This chapter also explores the ways that 
creativity is enhanced through the overlap of marginal zones across scale, unintentionally 
interfering with statist border enforcement and policing practices, and widening 
opportunities for migrants’ mobility. Specifically, I examine the alternative geographies 
produced during the CNTE teachers’ union protests, and look at how marginal spaces 
(the region of southern Mexico) and marginalized bodies (those of indigenous, rural 
Mexicans as well as those of Central American migrants) engage with each other in 
response to neoliberal state practices deployed at other scales.  
This thesis concludes by reviewing its contributions to feminist geopolitical 
geography and ethnographies of the state. Drawing attention to the grounded, embodied 
experiences encountered in the margins, this thesis explores how conflicting policy 
agendas mobilized at other scales produce landscapes of uncertainty for migrants 
navigating Mexico’s infrastructural and administrative borders. I recapitulate how, 
despite the confusion produced through the illegibility of the state, creativity in the 
margins persists, enabling the mapping of alternative geographies and mobilities. This 
final chapter argues that there is room for alliances across scales and locales, and that 
migrants’ accounts discussed in this thesis expose one of many margins, all of which 
need to be critically investigated. I suggest potential questions for future investigation, 
connecting the conclusions of this thesis with an emerging political context in which 
migration restrictions and prohibitions have increased, now inflected with overt racism 




Chapter II: State Narratives and Infrastructure at the Southern Border 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Before moving to the margins of the state where my ethnographic fieldwork is 
based, in this chapter I examine “official” border narratives told at other scales of 
analysis. Although these stories are produced and projected through distinct media and 
spaces, they are clustered around central state actors, and form an image of border 
enforcement in southern Mexico as coherent, ordered and humane. However, there are 
traces of contradiction within the state’s official border discourse, lines which might be 
connected to the confusion and uncertainty experienced by migrants in their grounded 
journeys through the border landscape. This chapter is not a comprehensive investigation 
of the ways that state narratives and performance of sovereignty shape migrants’ 
experience, but rather it suggests several discursive threads to follow between areas of 
analysis -- both at the center and the margins.  
My choice to draw connections between narratives rather than to situate everyday 
stories within official discourses is informed by the work of Bruno Latour, who 
emphasizes the “‘networky’ shape” of scalar relations in his book Reassembling the 
Social (2005, 178). Latour writes that “the macro is neither ‘above’ nor ‘below’ ...[local] 
interactions, but added to them as another of their connections, feeding them and feeding 
off them” (177). According to Latour’s theory of the social, scholars should avoid 
dividing data “in two heaps: one local and one global,” because “there exists no place that 
can be said to be ‘non-local.’ If something is ‘de-localized,’ it means that it is being sent 
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from one place to some other place, not from one place to no place” (178, 179). This 
conjecture aligns with the feminist geopolitical approach, which emphasizes the 
importance of grounding the state in material time-spaces, rather than allowing it to 
inflate and float overhead, opaque, impenetrable and all powerful. Instead, by 
“flattening” relations and drawing connections horizontally (in this case, from the 
margins to the center of the state), we disturb the usual vertical division between “local” 
and “global,” and thus re-structure “context” as connectivity rather than as a framing of 
events and activity.  
By examining some of the state’s narratives surrounding border enforcement in 
southern Mexico, this chapter raises questions concerning the distinct political objectives 
at work in mobilizing this increase in border enforcement. It illuminates the intersection 
of multiple political projects that involve the maintenance of state sovereignty, both in 
terms of control over who and what crosses territorial borders, and in relation to other 
nation-states. In some ways, these agendas diverge. On the one hand, increased border 
enforcement is used to facilitate the flow of “legitimate” trade between states, a project 
conducted in partnership with the United States and other neighboring countries. On the 
other hand, Mexican border enforcement is consistently framed in contradistinction from 
that of its northern neighbor; Mexican state narratives work to distance its border 
enforcement and immigration regulation practices from those of the U.S.  
These narratives are generated discursively and materially: in the words of 
politicians, the letter of the law, as well as in the construction and operation of border 
infrastructure. They are projected to distinct audiences, at differing volumes, through 
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diverse media. The louder narratives, heard in the politicians’ official statements and in 
recent changes to immigration law, project an image of humanitarian concern for 
migrants’ rights. The quieter narrative, echoed only subtly in the politicians’ narratives 
and more obviously in the built environment of the border region, betrays an intertwining 
of neoliberal interests and international security agendas, which the U.S. has taken the 
lead in directing. These conflicting narratives interact to produce a landscape of 
uncertainty for migrants, whose position within the state oscillates between inclusion and 
exclusion, as a “protected” people with certain rights, even as they are detained and 
deported at increasingly higher rates.  
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE PRACTICES  
 
 This chapter employs critical discourse analysis to trace connections between 
several centralized arenas of border-making in southern Mexico. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, a critical approach to discourse analysis pays attention to the ways that 
certain communicative practices reinforce power hierarchies and social inequalities (van 
Dijk 1998). More conventional approaches to discourse analysis examine language as the 
primary vehicle for shaping meaning and ideology. However, I follow the work of 
discourse scholars who also emphasize the importance of the material in shaping 
discourse in a co-constitutive process. 
This thesis contends that discourse is performative: it “focuses attention on the 
ongoing, dynamic, relational enactment of the world” rather than merely on the 
relationships of its representation (Orlikowski and Scott 2015, 700). It is a process, a 
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“series of critical encounters… rather than a singular event,” and thus meaning shifts, 
deepens and expands, ever-emergent and interactive (Steacy, Williams, Petterson, Kurtz 
2015, 169). Scholars Orlikowksi and Scott draw on the work of Karen Barad to explore 
material-discursive practices, understood as matter and meaning’s mutual entanglement 
(Orlikowski and Scott 2015). According to Barad, “discursive practices and material 
phenomena do not stand in a relationship of externality to one another, but rather, the 
material and discursive are mutually implicated in the dynamic of intra-activity” (Barad 
2009, 140). This intra-activity refers to the continuous, performative enactment of the 
boundaries separating subjects and objects as agency “flows” between them (Barad 2009, 
138). Barad argues that the discursive “is not what is said,” but rather is: 
that which is constrains and enables what can be said. Discursive practices 
define what counts as meaningful statements. Statements are not the mere 
utterances of the originating consciousness of a unified subject; rather, 
statements and subjects emerge from fields of possibility (Barad 2009, 
137).  
 
In the case of this chapter, I do not intend to trace a detailed genealogy of the material-
discursive becoming of the southern border of Mexico, but I do acknowledge that this 
process is indeed ongoing, and agree with Barad, Orlikowski and Scott that it is not 
limited to language or utterances. Discursive practices do not occur in a passive material 
context framing subjects’ activity. Rather, matter and meaning are mutually articulated in 
performative processes.  
Although my analysis of the first two arenas – politicians’ statements and 
immigration law – centers on narratives that are spoken or written, I focus attention on 
how they give shape to material events and spaces. At the third site of analysis I examine 
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the physical infrastructure of southern Mexico’s borderlands, including how it is spatially 
arranged and managed. These structures gain meaning in part through their everyday 
operation, but also through the discourses that are deployed at other scales regarding their 
purported purpose. 
While this is not a comprehensive investigation of border discourse in Mexico, 
this chapter attempts to illuminate some of the ways the state enacts territorial boundaries 
both discursively and materially. In these state performances, multiple narratives are 
generated; in some instances they overlap, but in others they seem to diverge. In all cases, 
they form part of the landscape that migrants must navigate when crossing through 
southern Mexico, and thus provide a good starting point for tracing connections between 
sites of border-making, from the center to the periphery.  
 
FIRST ARENA OF ANALYSIS: POLITICIANS’ STATEMENTS CONCERNING PFS7 
 
In May 2015, at a press conference held in front of a newly constructed Center for 
Comprehensive Attention for Border Transit (CAITF)8 in La Trinitaria, Chiapas, the 
Secretary of the Interior Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong announced the success Programa 
                                                 
7 Programa Frontera Sur (PFS), the series of policies aimed at “ordering” the flows of people and goods 
through the southern border region of Mexico, is not the first attempt at enhancing border enforcement in 
southern Mexico. Increased surveillance and economic development of the southern border region has been 
a topic of concern for the past three presidential administrations, beginning with Vicente Fox, Felipe 
Calderón and continuing with Peña Nieto. While pressure from the U.S. to seal the southern border has 
been constant, the reasons for establishing increased control have varied. However, what remains clear is 
the continued interest in deterring migrants from reaching the northern border of Mexico. For more, see 
Villafuerte Solís & García Aguilar 2015.  
8 Also referred to as “super-checkpoints,” the CAITFs are newly constructed, massive compounds located 
along main highways; they house up to eight federal agencies, including the INM, the Federal Police and 
the Navy, and are intended to enhance security through increased surveillance of border flows. For more on 
the CAITFs, see the following section.  
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Frontera Sur, begun nearly nine months earlier by President Enrique Peña Nieto. Osorio 
Chong reviewed the objectives of the border plan, summarized as: 1) to bring order to the 
cross-border flows of goods and people, and 2) to protect the human rights of migrants 
who move through the southern border region (SEGOB May 11, 2015).  The Secretary of 
the Interior argued that Programa Frontera Sur had indeed achieved this goal, and was 
gaining international attention as a result. He concluded the press conference with the 
statement: “We do not build fences, but rather unifying bridges between neighboring 
countries” (SEGOB May 11, 2015).  
This statement is powerful not only because it symbolically transforms the CAITF 
into a “bridge,” but also because it evokes -- and contrasts with -- the U.S. border fence. 
This statement is a declaration of difference between approaches to border enforcement, 
implicitly comparing U.S. and Mexican policies while deepening the connections 
between Mexico and the Central American countries beyond the southern border.  
Osorio Chong’s framing of Programa Frontera Sur echoes earlier statements 
issued at the program’s initiation in July 2014. President Enrique Peña Nieto, along with 
the Guatemalan president Otto Pérez Molina and Mexican federal and state officials, met 
in Playas de Catazajá, Chiapas, to inaugurate the operation of the CAITF located there. 
The CAITF would be a center-piece of the new border enforcement policies under 
Programa Frontera Sur, the announcement of which immediately followed U.S. media 
descriptions of a “wave” or “surge” in migration from Central America to the U.S. as 
well as President Obama’s declaration of an “urgent humanitarian situation” at the U.S.-
Mexico border (Zezima and O’Keefe 2014).  
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At this event, Programa Frontera Sur was repeatedly described as a regional 
collaboration project aimed at enhancing connection between “sibling” Mesoamerican 
countries. Each of the dignitaries at the event referred to nationals of their neighboring 
countries as brothers and sisters. The Chiapas governor Manuel Velasco extended this 
relation of intimacy to migrants as well, naming them “nuestras hermanas y hermanos 
migrantes” (our sister and brother migrants) (Presidencia de la República July 7, 2014). 
 The Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, José Antonio Meade Kuribreña, noted how 
Mexicans and Central Americans share “history and culture” as well as “values and 
dreams,” connecting them as descendents of the Mayas and Olmecs (Presidencia de la 
República July 7, 2014). President Enrique Peña Nieto and Secretary of the Interior 
Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong similarly drew parallels between Mexico and Central 
American countries’ shared histories as nations of emigration, even as they noted the 
recent shift towards return and transit migration in Mexico. These statements discursively 
function to bring Mexico into closer proximity with its southern neighbors, emphasizing 
unity in shared history, perspective and goals.  
At the same time, President Otto Pérez Molina hinted not so subtly at the 
difference between Mexico’s and other nations’ approaches to border governance. In his 
speech, the Guatemalan president stated that the “humanitarian vision” of border 
enforcement put forward by Enrique Peña Nieto’s administration differs from other 
countries’ treatment of borders and members of neighboring countries (Presidencia de la 
República July 7, 2014). According to Pérez Molina, Enrique Peña Nieto’s vision of 
border enforcement is an “example for other countries,” and a “model of successful 
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migration” (Presidencia de la República July 7, 2014). He stated, “instead of obstacles, 
there is facilitation” of development, and “instead of putting up walls, [Enrique Peña 
Nieto] has had a vision of unity” (Presidencia de la República July 7, 2014). The call for 
unity across borders is implicitly contrasted with closure and separation, evoked in the 
image of walls, which brings the U.S. border discourse to mind. By calling Programa 
Frontera Sur a “model” for other countries to follow, President Pérez Molina 
discursively distances Mexico’s border policy from those of fenced nations.  
This same sentiment is heard in Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong’s May 2015 speech 
in La Trinitaria, Chiapas. The declaration that Mexico builds bridges, not fences, 
performatively re-frames the southern border of Mexico as a space of humane treatment 
of migrants,9 attributed in part to its shared culture and indigenous roots, and in part to its 
shared history as nations of emigration to the U.S. These statements position Mexican 
border enforcement practices as distinct from those of countries with walls and fences. 
Importantly, the CAITF of La Trinitaria and Playas de Catazajá where both the July 2014 
and May 2015 press conferences took place are framed not as a means of blocking 
movement between nations, but rather as means of facilitating such flows; their power is 
not derived from their capacity to impede movement, but rather to allow it to occur 
through legitimate (i.e. legal) routes. 
                                                 
9 This position of humanitarian concern also serves to combat the image of Mexico as a country of 
widespread abuse of migrants, by organized criminals and law enforcement authorities alike. Migrant 
advocacy network REDODEM found that in 2015, 41.5% of the crimes against migrants were committed 
by law enforcement. For more, see REDODEM 2015, Amnesty International 2010, García Aguilar 2011. 
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Performance of Sovereignty 
 
In her book Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, Wendy Brown argues that the 
fencing fetish, apparent in countries like the U.S., Israel, and across Europe, arises from a 
fear of nation-state impotence when confronting seemingly unstoppable global flows 
(Brown 2014, 114). “In the face of an increasingly unbounded and uncontrolled global 
order, walls figure containment that exceeds mere protection against dangerous invaders 
and that pertains instead to a psychic unmanageability of living in such a world… 
Walling phantasmatically produces shelter when the actual boundaries of the nation cease 
to be containing…” (Brown 2014, 118).  
In Brown’s analysis, the appearance of visible barricades on nation-state lines 
serves as a performance of sovereignty -- a theatrical display of control, containment and 
division between the inside and outside of the territory, forming the basis of legitimacy of 
the nation-state. However, in the case of the southern border of Mexico, I argue that the 
absence of fences and walls is also a display of sovereign power. Especially in light of 
U.S. officials’ publicized statements naming the Guatemalan-Mexican border as now the 
U.S.’s “third border” (Treviño 2012; García Aguilar 2011), Mexico’s public rejection of 
the fence/wall image in their border discourse serves to portray Programa Frontera Sur 
as separate and free from the U.S.’s policy impositions, despite the fact that over $100 
million dollars’ worth of U.S. equipment and training has been directed to the southern 
border region of Mexico (Ribando Seelke & Finklea 2017, 15). 
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Threads of Multiple Narratives 
 
 There are traces of contradiction and divergence subtly woven into the 
“humanitarian” framing of Programa Frontera Sur: narratives of security and 
development are incorporated as means to increase migrants’ safety, even though in their 
realization they might present further harms to migrants. In his speech at the July 2014 
meeting, Secretary of Foreign Affairs José Antonio Meade Kuribreña emphasized not 
only Mexico and Central America’s “shared values and dreams,” bus also their shared 
“economies and societies” (Presidencia de la República July 7, 2014).  He focused on 
Programa Frontera Sur’s potential to create “prosperous, inclusive and secure” 
Mesoamerican nations, achieved in large part through the build-up of border 
infrastructure (like the CAITFs), as well as energy infrastructure, which would promote 
the flow commerce and investment in their countries (Presidencia de la República July 7, 
2014).  
 Similarly, President Otto Pérez Molina praised Enrique Peña Nieto’s “vision of 
development,” especially his implementation of a free worker visa program that would 
allow Guatemalans and Belizeans to work in the border states of southern Mexico. The 
Tarjeta de Trabajador Fronterizo (Border Worker Visa) would permit nationals from any 
part of the border countries -- not just the departments located on the border-line, as had 
been previously permitted -- to cross with their families into the border states in Mexico 
(Presidencia de la República July 7, 2014). In 2008, the work visa program had been 
expanded to include migrant laborers outside of agricultural industries, accommodating 
anticipated shifts in regional development (Alba and Castillo 2012, 4). In his speech, 
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Enrique Peña Nieto stated that his administration was working to extend the border 
worker visa to Honduras and El Salvador, the two other nations that have had a 
significant increase in migration through Mexico in recent years.  
 Although only alluded to in these statements under the terms “commerce” and 
“investment,” a number development projects have been proposed for the southern region 
of Mexico as part of Enrique Peña Nieto’s National Development Plan for years 2013-
2018. In an interview with El Universal, Humberto Mayans Canabal, the former leader of 
the Coordination for Comprehensive Attention for Migrants at the Southern Border 
(established shortly after the announcement of Programa Frontera Sur), stated that of the 
187 projects destined for the southern border region, nearly half are infrastructure 
projects, including the “modernizing” of the railroads as well as ports of entry (Torres 
2015). The additional projects proposed might include tourism, energy and extractive 
industries (Gobierno de la República 2013; SEDATU 2014). 
In these politicians’ statements, “development” is often mentioned in conjunction 
with “security” – it would seem that one cannot occur without the other. Both, 
supposedly, would increase migrants’ safety and protect their interests by bringing 
previously informal or clandestine activities into the legal folds of the state (i.e. the 
Border Worker Visa program). In the 2015 press conference at Playas de Catazajá, 
Miguel Osorio Chong dramatically stated that before Programa Frontera Sur, “there was 
no order, there was no coordination, it wasn’t known who were entering into Mexico, 
what their destination was, what their origin was, [they] had no data with respect to those 
who passed through or visited [their] country” (SEGOB May 11, 2015). He goes on to 
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immediately connect this lack of formal attention and surveillance to “the abuse of 
migrants” (ibid.).  
Several of the politicians at the July 2014 event linked security to the build-up of 
border infrastructure, including enhancement of information systems and technology. The 
implication is that with knowledge of the identities of those who cross borders, the 
dangerous people might be sorted from the desirable. Meade Kuribreña specifically 
mentioned plans to coordinate and standardize equipment across borders in Central 
America in order to “register and exchange migration data” (Presidencia de la República 
July 7, 2014). In this context, President Pérez Molina referenced the purpose of GANSEF 
(Grupo Alto Nivel de Seguridad Fronteriza), which has organized the transmission of 
migration data between member nations in “real time” (ibid.). He stated that with 
mechanisms like these in place, higher levels of security can be achieved in the region.  
The question remains as to what was causing such insecurity in the first place. 
Unlike border narratives in the U.S., which have focused on the threat posed by migrants 
themselves (Chavez 2008), in the case of Programa Frontera Sur in Mexico, the 
presumed danger of lax border enforcement remains much more nebulous. Although 
references were made to the dangers of organized crime and human trafficking (i.e. in 
Manuel Velasco Coello’s speech), it was also acknowledged by Miguel Osorio Chong in 
his 2015 speech that the southern Mexican states have some of the lowest rates of violent 
crime in the country (Presidencia de la República July 7, 2014; SEGOB May 11, 2015).10  
                                                 
10 While this assertion might be true with regard to permanent residents of the region, it almost certainly 
does not take into account the large number of crimes committed against migrants, which include robbery, 
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Furthermore, if we accept the assertion that security is intended especially for 
migrants’ safety, as the politicians suggest, it becomes concerning that few specific 
mechanisms for the protection of migrants’ rights were mentioned in these speeches. 
Rather, the focus was on the building-up of security infrastructure, like the CAITFs, and 
the sharing of database registries between nations. As far as social services for migrants 
are concerned, Enrique Peña Nieto did mention the expansion of medical services for 
migrants in Chiapas and the possibility of updating DIF (National System for 
Comprehensive Family Development) albergues and detention centers, where migrants 
are held before deportation. However, at this time he did not mention accountability 
systems for investigating government officials accused of exploiting migrants, or 
providing social services to victims of crimes in transit.  
In this border discourse, “security” is associated with surveillance -- knowledge of 
who and what passes through nation-state territories. “Order” is the desired outcome, and 
although it is rhetorically associated with migrants’ rights, it is functionally focused on 
increasing the scope of official information and providing regulated avenues for 
migrating regionally. As the Secretary of the Interior stated in his speech, the goals of 
Programa Frontera Sur are to bring informal activities of the margins into the legal folds 
of the state, implicitly under the sovereign jurisdiction of the state. In this way, the 
“ordering” of the southern border of Mexico is a performance of sovereignty -- a 
                                                                                                                                                 
assault, and rape, most of which has gone unreported to authorities until the past two years (Knippen, 
Boggs & Meyer 2015). 
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response to the push and pull of neoliberal processes that have opened up the region to 
international investment and development.  
Absence in Discourse: What was not said?  
 
 While much of this chapter has focused on what was said in the public statements 
concerning Programa Frontera Sur, what was not said is equally important in the 
shaping of Mexico’s southern border narrative. The politicians repeatedly referenced the 
objective of bringing order, inclusivity and prosperity to Mexico and Central America, 
and emphasized the importance of coordinated security on a regional level. However, 
they did not mention that many of the infrastructural updates planned at ports of entry, 
border crossings and at the CAITFs would be carried out with U.S. assistance.  The 
announcement of Programa Frontera Sur and the inauguration of the CAITF followed 
President Obama’s declaration of Central American migration as an “urgent humanitarian 
situation” by weeks (Zezima & O’Keefe 2014).11 Through the Mérida Initiative, over 
$2.5 billion US dollars have been funneled to Mexican security forces in the form of 
equipment, training and technology from FY2008 to FY2015 (Ribando Seelke & Finklea 
2016). Around 2011, funding provided through this initiative was increasingly directed to 
the southern border of Mexico specifically, now totaling over $100 million, including the 
development of biometric technology intended to help agencies gather and share 
                                                 
11 In September 2016, President Obama reportedly thanked Mexico for “absorbing a great number of 
refugees from Central America” (Nakamura 2016). Although officials have denied the United States’ direct 
funding of PFS, it has been clear that Mérida Initiative funding intended to build a “21st Century Border” 
has been extended to include Mexico’s southern border, most likely under pressure of Obama’s 
administration (Weiss 2016).  
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information on “criminals and migrants” (Ribando Seelke & Finklea 2017, 15; 
Villafuerte Solís & García Aguilar 2015).  
By erasing the U.S.’s role in enhancing border surveillance, these statements work 
against claims that the Mexican-Guatemalan-Belizean border is the U.S.’s “third border,” 
currently operating with funding, training and technology made available by the U.S. 
government (García Aguilar 2011). Furthermore, by contrasting their “humanitarian,” 
fenceless approach with that of the United States, the Mexican government claims 
distance from U.S. border policy plans, and performatively asserts its sovereignty as a 
nation-state with a unique approach to migration. At the same time, it visibly asserts 
sovereign control over its territory, which serves as the foundation for establishing and 
maintaining legitimacy as a nation-state.   
In summary, the border narratives that surface in these speeches emphasize 
Mexico’s unique and differentiated “humanitarian” approach to migration, implicitly 
contrasted with the U.S.’s border enforcement tactics, even as they emphasize union 
between Mesoamerican nations. Protection of migrants’ rights is coupled with plans for 
increased security and development; the former objective is framed as an ordering of the 
flows of the latter. Security is a means of bringing the illicit activities of the margins into 
the legal folds of the state; it is both a facilitation of trade (meant to encourage local 
migration), and a surveillance of who and what crosses nation-state borders. In this way, 
the politicians theatrically perform sovereignty as a staging of control over the territory, 
both in regard to the traffic of goods and labor and in regard to the imposition of external 
security agendas (evidenced in their rejection of “fences” and “walls”).  
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I do not argue that these speeches actually establish state sovereignty, but rather 
that they serve as “political gestures,” theatrical demonstrations suggesting control over 
the territory (Brown 2014, 91). As I will describe later in this chapter, the threads of these 
narratives, once unraveled from the broader border discourse, diverge or run into conflict 
with each other. In the following section, I will outline how recent changes in 
immigration law similarly reflect the narratives described in these statements -- the 
projection of an image of humanitarian concern, and differentiation from the U.S.’s 
approach to border enforcement. In the final section, I will explore the material 
manifestation of these policies and laws -- the construction and administration of border 
infrastructure in southern Mexico -- where the threads of these narratives appear to 
unravel.  
SECOND ARENA OF ANALYSIS: RECENT CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION LAW IN MEXICO 
 
 The politicians’ emphasis on protection of migrants’ human rights is also apparent 
in recent changes in Mexico’s immigration laws. Like the Programa Frontera Sur border 
enforcement policies, these changes have been heralded as examples of humane 
approaches to immigration, contrasted with those of the United States. It is held up as 
evidence that Mexico does not espouse a xenophobic, closed door attitude towards 
migrants, but rather one that promotes equality and protection of human rights.  
 The country’s first comprehensive migration law was passed in 2011, after 
successful advocacy efforts made by “actors from civil society, government and the 
international community” (Global Detention Project 2013). The passage of the law came 
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on the heels of the widely-publicized tragedy: in August 2010, authorities discovered a 
clandestine gravesite of 72 murdered Central American migrants in Tamaulipas, northern 
Mexico. As the event garnered international attention, it generated the criticism that 
Mexico was hypocritical in its demands for better treatment of its emigrants in the U.S., 
considering violence against transmigrants was rampant within its own borders. In part as 
a response to this critique, and in part as a result of ongoing advocacy efforts from civil-
society organizations, the 2011 Ley de Migración (Migration Law) was approved by 
Mexico’s Congress “in a rare unanimous vote” (Alba 2013).12  
 Formerly, issues surrounding transmigration through Mexico fell under the 
jurisdiction of the 1974 Ley General de Población (General Population Law), which 
focused mostly on legal enforcement and regulation of migration into the country. It was 
seen as “an instrument of vigilance, focused on regulating the entry, stay, voluntary exit, 
and forced expulsion of foreigners from Mexico” (Gonzalez-Murphy & Koslowski 2011, 
4). Until reforms were made in 2008, this law also made migration without 
documentation a federal crime, punishable with up to 10 years in prison (13). Although 
this provision was rarely enforced, the 2008 reform “demoted the felony offense to an 
administrative infraction with a fine of up to 5,000 pesos…”, resulting symbolically in 
the decriminalization of migration (13). However, in the “absence of further migration 
                                                 
12 Although the law was passed in 2011, its implementation began in November 2012 (Carte 2013). 
Migrant rights organizations have noted that some of the protections provided in the law, such as 
Regularización Humanitaria, discussed in greater depth in the following chapter, were not enacted in vigor 
until recently. For instance, WOLA noted that in 2013, only 277 tarjetas humanitarias were issued, while 
in 2016 the number grew to 3,971 (for more, see  https://www.charts.datawrapper.wola.org/VdgH8/ ; and 
Unidad de Política Migratoria 2016). Experts contend that this delay in application of the law is due to an 
initial lack of funding and training for state officials. 
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legislation at that time, [the reform] changed very little on the ground” (Rodríguez & 
Jonas 2014, 111).  
 In contrast, the new 2011 Ley de Migración makes human rights protection and 
the combat of discrimination its explicit intention. According to the new law, “all 
immigrants, regardless of their status are granted the right to access education and health 
services…[as well as] the right to due process” (González-Murphy and Koslowski 2011, 
19). Although medical services and means to address human rights violations had been 
incorporated into federal and some state laws prior to 2011, the new law includes new 
mechanisms to enforce these rights, including the creation of an office of the Prosecutor 
within the Solicitor General’s Office (the Procuraduría General de la República), which 
focuses on “investigating crimes against migrants and protection of their human rights” 
(Carte 2013, 88; Gonzalez-Murphy & Koslowski 2011, 19).  
 The 2011 Migration Law also reinforces earlier attempts to centralize and 
standardize procedures of the National Migration Institute (INM), the SEGOB-surrogate 
agency in charge of migration-related issues. The new standardized approach, originally 
established as part of an Institutional Transformation Plan of the INM, would combat 
internal corruption resulting from the discretionary powers of local INM authorities, as 
permitted under the 1974 General Population Law (Gonzalez-Murphy & Koslowski 
2011, 14). It also requires the use of online application procedures, streamlined through a 
“new centralized information system...that replaced the many stand-alone systems in 
INM offices throughout Mexico” (14).  
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 Politicians framed the 2011 Migration Law as a victory for migrants’ rights that 
might be held up as an example for other nations to follow. Upon the bill’s submission to 
Mexico’s Congress in 2010, Senator Rubén Velásquez of the PRD stated that the law, if 
passed, “would become Mexico’s voice to the world on how migrants should be treated” 
(Michele & Gómez 2010). Similarly, when signing the bill into law, then President Felipe 
Calderón stated that  
“...the Mexican government is doing what we have requested for many 
years; for example, from the United States: decriminalize migration and 
pay attention more sensibly and sensitively to the complex reality we live” 
(Alba and Castillo 2012, 17).  
 
Like the discourse surrounding Programa Frontera Sur, these statements reflect a border 
narrative based in humanitarian concern for migrants, defined in contrast with the 
immigration laws of the United States.  
 
Threads of Contradiction 
 
 Although the Migration Law is widely regarded as a step in the right direction 
with respect to migrants’ rights, some civil society organizations and academics have 
identified room for contradiction in the new law. In their 2012 report La Detención de 
Personas Extranjeras en Estaciones Migratorias, the organization Sin Fronteras A.C. 
noted certain inconsistencies between the constitution and the 2011 Migration law 
concerning the legality and amount of time that migrants might be lawfully detained. 
They argue that privation of liberty (i.e. detention for non-criminal offences) is forbidden 
under Articles 21 and 16 of the Constitution; however, the INM holds that the detention 
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(aseguramiento) of migrants is not a privation of liberty, but rather a restriction on free 
transit, which is constitutionally permitted (Sin Fronteras 2012, 8). The organization also 
observed that under the new law, migrants’ documentation status would be decided 
within a period of 15 days; many migrants are not released until their migratory status is 
determined, at the end of the two-week period, even though the Constitution states that 
administrative detention can last no longer than 36 hours (Sin Fronteras 2012, 8).  
 Similarly, the organization Insyde A.C. (El Instituto para la Seguridad y la 
Democracia) found certain provisions of the Migration Law to be either too weak or even 
contradictory in terms of protection of migrants’ rights. The decriminalization of 
migrants was symbolically established in the prohibition of migrant detention in jails (in 
contrast with detention practices in the U.S.) and in granting the INM exclusive 
jurisdiction over apprehension and detention of irregular migrants (and thereby 
prohibiting police and military from doing so). Since 2008, the INM no longer uses lethal 
weapons in its operations, thus distinguishing its duties from those of agencies 
responsible for criminal law enforcement. However, as pointed out in a 2013 Insyde 
report, in the Migration Law regulations, the INM can ask for assistance in their 
operations from other law enforcement agencies, like the Federal Police (Wolf 2013, 35). 
Furthermore, although the INM is unarmed, they have continued to use force in the 
detaining of migrants; in some cases, they have even used tasers in migrant apprehension 
operations (Wolf 2013, 35; Isacson, Meyer & Smith 2015). Migrant advocacy networks 
also report that extortion, sexual assault and even kidnapping by federal officials 
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continues to be a severe problem for migrants transiting Mexico (Knippen, Boggs, & 
Meyer 2015; REDODEM 2017). 
 Scholars Alba and Castillo similarly noted that the emphasis on both human rights 
and security “can appear contradictory and doubtlessly require[s] the agencies mandated 
with its implementation to enjoy a degree of discretion as they prioritize certain 
objectives over others” (Alba and Castillo 2012, 15). The overlap of immigration 
regulation and security is evidenced in the 2005 declaration that the INM was, in fact, a 
security entity, a decision no doubt tied to the signing of the Security and Prosperity 
Partnership (SSP) by Canada, the U.S. and Mexico that year (Wolf 2013, 18; Guevara 
Moyano 2016, 43). The Partnership, or Alianza, as its named in Spanish, “sought to 
create intelligent and secure borders, promote common economic development and align 
security agendas for North America” (2016, 43). In light of this security agreement (and 
others signed in later years), we might understand the centralization and standardization 
of migration status processing through an online platform as an attempt to make 
information from various database registries nationally accessible, and, if need be, 
internationally shareable through agreements like the SSP and GANSEF.  
 In summary, as argued in the case of Programa Frontera Sur, in the 2011 
Migration Law multiple narratives are present. The more publicized narrative frames the 
law as an example of protection of human rights, in contradistinction to the model put 
forward in U.S. laws. However, there is evidence of other narratives at play in Mexico’s 
migration discourse, providing grounds to question how other objectives -- such as 
security and sovereignty -- intersect with the goal of protecting migrants’ rights. Below, 
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in the final section of this chapter, I explore how narratives of border security and 
migration intersect in the physical border infrastructure in southern Mexico, more clearly 
manifesting some of the contradictions traced in the previous areas of analysis.  
THIRD ARENA OF ANALYSIS: BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTHERN MEXICO 
 
 In the final section of this chapter, I investigate how the material and the 
discursive are “mutually articulated” in the construction, arrangement and operation of 
border infrastructure in southern Mexico (Barad 2009). The narrative of humanitarian 
concern, upheld in the two previous areas of analysis, is less apparent in the built 
environment of the border region, even though the complementary objectives of security 
and development are more immediately visible. Importantly, this focus on securitization 
more strongly links Mexico’s approach to border enforcement with that of the U.S., in 
opposition to the projected narratives of the previous sections, which work to distance the 
countries’ approaches to migration.  
 While there are no visible walls or fences at the southern border of Mexico, a 
point driven home by Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong in his May 2015 press conference, 
there is an intricate and expansive landscape of border infrastructure that extends well 
beyond the territorial nation-state line. In March 2014, before Programa Frontera Sur 
was officially initiated, Mexico’s National Security Council (CNS) announced a plan to 
increase border enforcement by installing three “belts of control” in the southern region 
of the country (Villafuerte Solís and García Aguilar 2015). The first belt begins 30 miles 
from the Guatemalan border “in the zone of Huixtla, Suchiate, Arriaga, Trinitaria, 
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Comitán, Benemérito de las Américas, [and] Palenque” (Isacson, Meyer and Morales 
2014). The second belt stretches from Arriaga, across Chiapas to the Gulf Coast of 
Tabasco; the final belt crosses the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the narrowest section of 
Mexico, in the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz (see Fig. 1 below).  
 
Figure 1. Belts of Control in Southern Mexico (from Google Maps, edited by author).  
 
The types of infrastructure that form part of the border landscape vary significantly in 
size, visibility, and stated purpose. According to reports by the Washington Office on 
Latin America, structures include: 
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1. Official Border Crossings on the borderline with Guatemala and Belize, managed 
by the SAT (Servicio de Administración Tributaria), the INM, and various other 
agencies.  
 
2. Naval bases near the borderline and also in the interior of Chiapas, managed by 
SEMAR (Secretaría de Marina).  
 
3. Comprehensive Centers for Attention to Border Transit (Centros de Atención 
Integral al Tránsito Fronterizo) (CAITFs or super-checkpoints) located 30 to 50 
miles from the borderline with Guatemala, along main highways. These super-
checkpoints house up to eight federal agencies and are jointly managed (see 
section on Comprehensive Centers for Attention to Border Transit for more).  
 
4. Army bases within the interior of Chiapas managed by SEDENA (Secretaría de 
Defensa Nacional). 
 
5. Federal Police Headquarters in Tapachula and Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas, 
managed by the Federal Police, overseen by CNS (Comisión Nacional de 
Seguridad).  
 
6. Large-scale detention centers in Tapachula, Chiapas and Acayucan, Veracruz 




An interactive map generated by WOLA details the locations of the aforementioned 
border infrastructure (WOLA February 2016).13 Not featured on this map are the fixed 
and mobile checkpoints managed by SEDENA, the Federal Police and the INM. Reports 
indicate that checkpoints are concentrated on the federal highways, including the Coastal 
Highway leading from Guatemala along the Pacific Coast of Chiapas into Oaxaca and 
throughout the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.  
 Although migrants must navigate all the aforementioned infrastructure in crossing 
through southern Mexico, certain infrastructure types (such as those managed by the 
INM) are explicitly intended for migration regulation, while others (such as the SEDENA 
and SEMAR bases and checkpoints) purport to address other “security” issues, such as 
combatting organized crime. While there have been reports that the latter checkpoint 
systems have impeded migrant mobility, in this chapter, I focus my analysis on 
infrastructure explicitly intended for migration regulation, which excludes SEDENA and 
SEMAR checkpoints and bases. 
 Also missing from WOLA’s map are the 200 INM offices located around the 
country, including at ports of entry and airports.14 Nearly one third of these offices are 
located in the southern border region. While the airport locations are only used to revise 
documents of people entering the country, at other INM offices migrants can submit 
paperwork to change their migratory status. The Global Detention Project notes that the 
                                                 
13 The map might be retrieved at https://www.wola.org/maps/1602_border/full-screen.html .  
14 See http://www.inm.gob.mx/gobmx/word/index.php/horarios-y-oficinas/ .  
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2011 Law of Migration allows for some of these offices to also temporarily serve as 
provisional detention centers (Global Detention Project 2013).  
Centers for Comprehensive Attention to Border Transit (CAITFs) 
 
 As the sites of both the June 2014 and May 2015 press conferences concerning 
Programa Frontera Sur, the CAITFs have had the greatest amount of visibility of the 
border structures. Although euphemistically described as “bridges” between nations, 
these Centers serve as headquarters for securitization of the region.  They were originally 
part of the SAT’s (Mexico’s customs agency) plan for enhanced monitoring of goods 
crossing into Mexico, but transformed into sites of inter-agency coordination. The 
Centers house up to eight agencies, which pertain to: the Secretaría de Gobernación 
(SEGOB, the Secretary of the Interior); the Secretaría de Defensa Nacional (SEDENA, 
the Army); the Secretaría de Marina (SEMAR, the Navy); the Secretaría de Hacienda y 
Crédito Público (SCHP, the Secretary of Finance); the Secretaría de Agricultura, 
Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación (SAGARPA, the Secretary of 
Agriculture); and the Secretaría de Salud (SS, the Secretary of Health) (SEGOB, 
Decreto, 2014). Under the Secretary of the Interior, the Federal Police, INM and 
Procuraduría General de la República (PGR, the Attorney General of Mexico) also 
jointly operate there. 
 These centers are massive compounds. The Instituto Nacional de Administración 
y Avalúos de Bienes Nacionales (INDAABIN) (Administration and Appraisal of 
National Real Estate Institute) lists the areas of these complexes as ranging from 80,00.95 
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sq. meters to 267,823.92 sq meters.15 Because they contain two or more federal agencies 
and share common space and maintenance costs, the complexes are maintained by 
INDAABIN.16 However, the protocols for coordinating the various agencies are jointly 
determined by a Coordination Group led by SEDENA, the Army (PGR 2016). 
 The decision to expand the Centers to include multiple agencies aligns with the 
agenda set in the Programa para la Seguridad Nacional 2014-2018 (National Security 
Program 2014-2018) -- that is, to increase the “presence of the State in the [southern 
border] area and to coordinate plans with Central American countries,” thereby 
establishing a modern, efficient, prosperous, and secure border (SEGOB, Acuerdo, 2014). 
Although the Centers are purported to fulfill the government’s interest in protecting 
migrants’ rights, they seem to be mostly focused on establishing “order” through security, 
as evidenced by their leadership (SEDENA, the Army). PGR, the agency in charge of 
investigating crimes committed against migrants, was only integrated into the CAITF 
system nearly two years after their establishment by Enrique Peña Nieto in June 2014, 
appearing more as an afterthought than an integral part of the border security plan (PGR 
2016). 
Detention Centers  
 
Under the 2011 Migration Law, there are two main types of administrative 
detention infrastructures: a) “provisional” facilities, which are meant for short- to 
                                                 




medium- term detention, and b) long-term detention facilities, “which are euphemistically 
called ‘migratory stations’ ” rather than detention centers (Global Detention Project 
2013). The regulations of the 2011 law establishes “two types of estancias provisionales: 
‘category A’ facilities, which are limited to 48-hour detention periods; and ‘category B’ 
facilities, which can be used for confinement periods of up to seven days” (ibid.). As 
mentioned previously, certain INM checkpoints also serve as provisional detention 
facilities, although it is unknown if they fall into “category A” or “B.”  Migrants who are 
apprehended by the INM are usually housed at the provisional facilities until they can be 
transferred to the long-term detention centers. Some sources report that because long-
term detention facilities are often at capacity, migrants are moved back and forth between 
provisional detention centers, thereby bypassing detention regulation.  
According to information compiled by the Global Detention Project, “as of 2012, 
Mexico operated 35 long-term facilities and 23 provisional facilities,” although it is likely 
that the actual number is much higher (Global Detention Project 2013). Researchers 
noted that the number of detention centers has more than doubled since 2000, “when the 
INM reported having just 22 detention centers” (Diaz and Kuhner 2008).  
In 2006, the largest detention center in Mexico, referred to as the 21st Century 
Migration Station, was opened in Tapachula, Chiapas, with a capacity of up to 960 
people at a time (Diaz and Kuhner 2008). Other large detention centers are located in 
Acayucán, Veracruz (with a capacity of 836), Iztapalapa, Mexico City (with a capacity of 
430), Tijuana and Tenosique (both with a capacity of 100) (Global Detention Project 
2013).  
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Although politicians have described these detention centers as respectful of 
human rights, several civil society organizations have raised concerns regarding 
migrants’ treatment in these spaces. The 2013 Insyde report observed that despite the fact 
that the INM has worked to improve the physical conditions of the centers, they continue 
to have a prison-like quality, in part due to how they are run, in part due to the boredom 
and uncertainty that arises from such confinement (Wolf 2013, 36). In a similar vein, the 
Center for Human Rights Fray Matías de Córdova found that the 21st Century Migration 
Station in Tapachula lacked adequate space for human rights defenders to consult with 
detainees and provide necessary information to ensure their rights were protected (CDH 
Fray Matías 2013, 16). Both organizations connect this management of detention centers 
to securitizing of the INM. According to their investigations, the decision to make this 
institution a national security entity has resulted in the primacy of national security over 
individual, human security.  
The emphasis on national security is also evident in the coordination with the 
United States in the oversight of these facilities. In an interview, an INM agent admitted 
to seeing U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers “ ‘work regularly inside [the] 
migrant detention center near the border known as Siglo 21’ ” (Matalon 2016). According 
to this agent, “the U.S. [has been] helping to collect data on migrants and migrant flows 
through improved fingerprinting techniques, among other initiatives” (Matalon 2016). 
After Matalon’s article was published, the CBP contacted the Fronteras Desk, issuing the 
following statement:  
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DHS and INM share information and collaborate on a wide range of 
bilateral and regional immigration and border protection issues. As part of 
the Merida Initiative, and in conjunction with the Department of State [of 
the U.S.], CBP supports Mexican customs and immigration counterparts 
with a variety of technical assistance and capacity building programs 
aimed at both enhancing security and facilitating legitimate travel and 
trade (Matalon 2016).   
 
In this statement, the DHS betrays a level of coordination between the U.S. and Mexico 




 In the interior of the country, numerous INM-run checkpoints (fixed and mobile) 
operate to detain undocumented migrants moving along main highways. Some of these 
fixed checkpoints have been in place for over a decade, but were recently updated under 
Programa Frontera Sur. Documents from the Department of Homeland Security indicate 
that the U.S. has shared an interest in fortifying and increasing the operation of 
checkpoints in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (the third belt of control) specifically. A 2014 
briefing document for a telephone call between the U.S. DHS and the Mexican 
Ambassador to the United States indicates that “establishing checkpoint and mobile team 
operations in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec,” along with increased collection and sharing of 
biometric data, aligned with U.S. priorities of “addressing migrant flows from Central 
America”  (DHS 2014).  
 The Global Detention Project, which observed these facilities in 2012, recorded 
that the checkpoints also serve as provisional detention centers intended for short to 
medium term holding of undocumented migrants (Global Detention Project 2013). 
 59 
Certain INM checkpoints include medical facilities and separate dorms for women and 
men (Fernández). The checkpoint in San Pedro de Tapanatepec, in the Isthmus, has a 
holding capacity of 30 people, while that in La Ventosa can hold up to 60 people at a 
time. Some checkpoints also include air conditioning and TV, which might be features in 
the INM’s efforts to “humanize” migration control.  
 In addition to updating pre-existing fixed checkpoints, the Mexican government 
has also increased its use of mobile checkpoints (volantas), which move along federal 
highways, changing location frequently so as to take migrants unawares. Journalists have 
reported their operation in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, between the towns of Reforma 
and Chahuites as well as between Unión Hidalgo and Juchitán, Oaxaca. There is little 
information as to what these mobile checkpoints consist of, but journalists’ accounts 
suggest they may involve impromptu roadblocks using INM vans or other vehicles, 
managed jointly by the INM and the Federal Police. It is likely that mobile non-intrusive 
inspection equipment, donated by the U.S. government to Mexican security forces, are 




 The unspoken border narrative, visible in the construction and management of 
immigration infrastructure in southern Mexico, emphasizes security, achieved in part 
through U.S. collaboration (via funding, training, and shared technology used in these 
facilities). This security focus is apparent in the statistical rise of migrant detention in 
Mexico the year following the announcement of Programa Frontera Sur. Analyzing data 
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supplied by the INM and the CBP, the Washington Office on Latin America found that 
between October 2014 and April 2015, the Mexican immigration agency had detained 
more Central American migrants than the U.S. border patrol (WOLA 2015); they also 
observed an increase in human rights violations perpetrated by INM agents against 
migrants, as documented by Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission (Comisión 
Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH) (Meyer 2016). The increase in INM 
activity, both at mobile and fixed checkpoints along highways, as well as more rigorous 
monitoring and intentionally increased speed of the train (la Bestia), has forced migrants 
to take more dangerous paths north (Meyer 2016). Rather than safeguarding migrants’ 
rights, Programa Frontera Sur has put migrants in greater danger than in previous years. 
This narrative diverges from the border discourse put forward in Mexico’s 2011 
Migration Law as well as in politicians’ statements concerning Programa Frontera Sur. 
In the aforementioned discursive arenas of analysis, border enforcement and immigration 
regulation is framed in humanitarian terms; migrants’ rights and unity among 
Mesoamerican countries is central to their narrative. Additionally, they work to distance 
Mexican approaches to border enforcement from those of the U.S.: the absence of a fence 
at the southern border of Mexico functions to symbolically separate U.S. and Mexican 
border policies and practices. They serve as theatrical performances of sovereignty, 
projecting an image of order and control over the territory in relation to the traffic of 
goods and people, as well in distinction from its northern neighbor.  
However, as argued in the final section in this chapter, it is evident that what has 
materialized in the southern border region differs significantly from the idealized, 
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“model” approach to immigration regulation that Mexican politicians have proposed. 
Migrants’ rights have not been the focus of the build-up of border infrastructure, and 
there is evidence of direct U.S. participation in immigration control in the region. The 
mixed messaging resulting from these conflicting policy agendas -- solidarity with 
Central American migrants, on the one hand, and partnership with the U.S. in stemming 
migrant flows, on the other -- has helped to generate a landscape of uncertainty for 
migrants moving through the region. Even as access to legal protections are slowly made 
available to migrants (i.e. the eventual establishment of the Unit for Investigation of 
Crimes Against Migrants, under the PGR, and the modest expansion of COMAR, the 
agency responsible for processing asylum claims), they continue to be detained and 














Chapter III: Migration Narratives in the Margins 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In this chapter, I shift sites of analysis from the “center” of geopolitical discourse 
to the margins, where border-making is experienced in embodied and material forms. 
 This movement follows both feminist geopolitical geographers’ attention to embodied 
knowledge and experience of geopolitics in the everyday, and Latour’s theorization of 
horizontal connections between scales rather than their nested containment, one within 
the other: the stories encountered at the periphery of the state partake in the material-
discursive construction of the southern border in Mexico. To better understand the 
perspective of border-making from the margins, I switch tools of analysis from critical 
discourse analysis to ethnography, focusing on the material effects, events and obstacles 
encountered in navigating the territorial and administrative boundaries of the state. 
Research Site 
 
I chose to conduct my research in Oaxaca, rather than in a state located on the 
borderline of Mexico, because of its position beyond the three belts of control 
implemented under Programa Frontera Sur. In doing so, I was able to speak with 
migrants who had already navigated through the labyrinth of border infrastructure and 
enforcement personnel placed throughout the southern border region, and could more 
adequately assess the impacts of the recent immigration enforcement policies.  Shelter 
workers identified Oaxaca de Juárez, Oaxaca as one of the last stops for migrants 
traveling to Mexico City along the Pacific route north. Although the INM is active 
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throughout the country, some migrant advocates indicated that their presence is strongest 
in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, which represents the shortest distance between the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Pacific Ocean -- a site where, despite the increased presence of law 
enforcement, many crimes against migrants are reported to occur (Chaca 2015). 
The albergue where I volunteered and conducted research is part of a larger 
network of non-governmental organizations that provide humanitarian services to 
migrants and stay in communication concerning trends occurring along migration routes. 
Some migrants stayed at other albergues in Chiapas and in the Isthmus before arriving at 
Oaxaca de Juárez. Many of them had spent time at an albergue in Ixtepec,17 renowned for 
its politically outspoken founder, Padre Solalinde. This albergue, located along the train 
route of La Bestia, was reported to be hosting hundreds of people at once the summer of 
2016.  
While most migrants chose to follow the train north from Ixtepec to Veracruz, 
others traveled by bus, car or even walked to Oaxaca de Juárez instead. They might have 
taken this route for various reasons: to earn money in the relatively large state capital 
before moving further north; to file paperwork at the local INM office, or perhaps to find 
safety along a less traveled route. As it was explained to me by shelter workers and 
advocates, more common routes bypass the capital city, traveling either north through the 
                                                 
17 Ixtepec is a town located in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, located a short distance from the infamous train 
that carries many migrants north on their journey to the United States.  
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Isthmus of Tehuantepec to Veracruz or keeping along the Gulf Coast, passing through 
Chiapas, Tabasco and then to Veracruz.18 
The shelter where I conducted my research receives most of its funding from 
private donations rather than government assistance. Although the albergue is under the 
direction of a Catholic priest, it does not receive funding directly from the Catholic 
Church. This allows it to function somewhat independently, with some flexibility in how 
it is run, who it hosts, and how long guests can stay. Despite this flexibility, due to lack of 
space and resources migrants are usually encouraged to leave the albergue after three 
days. Exceptions are made if someone is ill, or if they are processing visa or asylum 
claims with the local INM office. While the shelter most commonly hosts migrants from 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, people emigrating from Mexico are 
also welcome to stay there.  
During my summer fieldwork, from early June to early August 2016, the number 
of migrants staying at the shelter waxed and waned considerably. Some days the shelter 
was nearly empty; other days it was at capacity. I was told that the largest number of 
people staying at the shelter at once was 33. Normally, there were about 7 to 15 people 
staying at the shelter at a time.  
Shelter staff included four people: two women who worked in the shelter’s office, 
another woman who ran the kitchen, and one man, from El Salvador, who acted as a 
groundskeeper and lived on site. The three women, all from Oaxaca, stayed at the shelter 
                                                 
18 For more, see WOLA’s report Mexico’s Other Border: Security, Migration, and the Humanitarian 
Crisis at the Line with Central America (Isacson, A., et. al., 2014). 
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until around 2 pm each day. The director of the shelter (el Padre, as everyone called 
him), had founded the shelter in 2003. As a parish priest, the albergue director attended 
to many other issues outside the shelter every day, and spent considerable time 
facilitating events at his parish to raise awareness and support for the shelter.  
Aside from the shelter staff, there were several volunteers who visited regularly. 
A young man, about my age, from Oaxaca, worked daily at the shelter as part of his 
social work degree. Two women from the United States volunteered on a weekly or 
biweekly basis, working on separate projects remotely. During my time there, I heard 
about other volunteers from elsewhere in Mexico and the U.S who had volunteered at the 
shelter for a few months at a time.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, groups from U.S. universities, churches or 
human rights education programs visited the shelter throughout the summer. During these 
visits, shelter staff would give presentations on the state of migration through Mexico 
under Programa Frontera Sur. Migrants were sometimes invited to share their stories, 
including their reasons for leaving their home countries and their experiences en route.  
Research Methods 
 
 In alignment with feminist geopolitical researchers’ grounded approach to 
studying the state, I conducted my investigation primarily as a participant observer at the 
shelter. As Bernard (2006) has argued, the immersive quality of participant observation 
produces rapport, which gives researchers access to otherwise private or less visible 
activities as well as “experiential knowledge that lets you talk convincingly, from the gut, 
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about what it feels like to plant a garden in the high Andes or dance all night in a street 
rave in Seattle” (Bernard 2006, 342). I would add that it also serves as the basis for 
collaboratively producing knowledge through “partial connections” (de la Cadena 2015). 
De la Cadena writes that “partial connections enable the analysis of how [“this” and 
“that”] appear within each other and at the same time remain distinct” (2015, 33). As an 
outsider to the migration experience, my understanding of shelter dynamics and 
migration through Mexico is certainly distinct from that of my informants. However, by 
participating in the same practices and routines as others working and staying at the 
shelter, I became invested in goals of the organization, and absorbed some of its rhythms 
and language. The connections I formed with others -- although imperfect and partial -- 
provided a foundation for collaboratively producing knowledge surrounding migration 
under Programa Frontera Sur.   
 There are a number of ethical questions involved in conducting participant 
observation research, not least of which is deciding what information to include and what 
to omit in research results. Before beginning my fieldwork, I had received UT IRB 
approval to carry out this project, and had also obtained permission from the Padre to 
conduct participant observation research at the shelter as a volunteer. However, he had 
explicitly asked me not to use any specific, personal information about the guests at the 
shelter in order to protect them from subsequent identification. Prior to this conversation, 
I had not planned to use names or other identifying information in my thesis, but his 
request made me highly cognizant of the need to transmit stories with care, recording 
only information that was relevant to my topic of study, migration through the margins of 
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the state. Based on my conversation with the shelter director and my positionality as a 
student researcher and outsider to the migration experience, I decided not to include 
migrants’ life histories in this research even though many people at the shelter openly 
shared their personal narratives in public settings. Instead, I have chosen to focus on 
migrants’ experiences navigating the administrative and infrastructural borders of the 
state in Mexico, leaving out more personal aspects of migrants’ journeys or life 
trajectories so as to keep their identities anonymous. By focusing on routines and 
repeated narratives among migrants, this research highlights general trends in migration 
through southern Mexico in the summer of 2016, rather than personal stories.  
 My schedule at the shelter varied, but I would normally spend mornings until 
early afternoons there, while the shelter office was open. I visited the shelter three to four 
days a week, changing my schedule depending on the number of people staying there and 
special events planned for that week. Immediately after visiting the shelter, I would write 
my fieldnotes for several hours.  
On days when I was not at the shelter, I conducted participant observation 
elsewhere in Oaxaca City, taking in the landscape of securitization (and resistance to 
securitization) by attending open discussions, rallies or other public events held around 
the city. Although most of these forums or political events did not focus on migration 
specifically, I noticed that there were potential opportunities for alliance between local 
and transient populations.  
My research also included several semi-structured interviews with migrant 
advocates from various organizations, as well as with a few migrants I met at the shelter. 
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When interviewing advocates, we would meet at a neutral location or in their offices. 
Questions focused on the impact of Programa Frontera Sur on migration, their 
perspective on U.S. involvement in the implementation of Programa Frontera Sur, 
challenges that migrants and advocacy organizations currently face, and the role of 
advocacy organizations in helping migrants navigate the state bureaucracy.   
In the case of migrants, interviews were more difficult to arrange, and were 
conducted in-situ -- that is, in the albergue where we had met. There was little private 
space at the albergue, which made interviewing with migrants difficult. Because the 
circumstances for conducting interviews were less than ideal at the albergue and privacy 
was difficult to maintain, questions did not focus on life histories, traumatic narratives or 
issues of violence. Instead, questions focused on the specifics of navigating the 
infrastructural and administrative borders of the state: namely, the means of traveling 
through securitized or surveillanced territory, and the process of filing Regularización 
Humanitaria requests with the INM. Furthermore, most migrants passed through the 
albergue quickly, providing little time to build rapport and to allow us to both feel 
comfortable enough to conduct an interview. For the few interviews I did conduct, I 
chose to approach people who stayed at the shelter longer than average, whom I had 
gotten to know through everyday activities and casual conversation in the days prior.  In 
retrospect, I would attribute my reticence to approach migrant informants for interviews 
in part to my nervousness and inexperience as a student researcher. If future research 
were to be conducted, I would certainly obtain more interviews -- and have them 
recorded and transcribed -- to solidify my findings.  
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This chapter theorizes albergues and migration routes as margins of the state, 
where conditions of exceptionality are experienced spatially and temporally. It also 
explores how albergues in particular serve as liminal thresholds to accessing the 
protections afforded migrants in Mexico: through advocate mediation, migrants become 
visible to the state, and the state becomes legible to migrants. The relationships cultivated 
by shelter staff and migration advocates with state officials are crucial to this process, 
demonstrating how the state is not simply an abstract institutional power, but is also 
embodied, made up of individuals whose attitudes towards migrants might change 
through their contact with advocates. At the same time, on the periphery of these 
institutions, the state is still often experienced by migrants as illegible, opaque and 
“illogical.” In this landscape of uncertainty, migrants are perpetually relegated to the 
margins, even as they navigate formal routes to state inclusion.  
ALBERGUES AS MARGINS 
 
Following the work of Das and Poole (2004), as well as Mountz (2010, 2011), 
this thesis contends that the margins of the state - zones of exception, fragmented 
protection and paradoxical inclusion and exclusion - extend beyond territorial borders 
and are apparent in everyday encounters between migrants, migrant advocates and the 
state. These zones of precarity shift along migration routes through southern Mexico, 
where the state has worked to increase border enforcement and impede Central American 
migration north, even as it professes to offer certain protections to migrants. These 
conflicting messages are apparent not only in the border discourse and infrastructure 
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under Programa Frontera Sur, discussed in the previous chapter, but also in everyday 
interactions with the state.  
As spaces of permitted clandestinity, albergues serve as thresholds to state 
inclusion. They exhibit the overlap of formal and informal cartographies: on the one 
hand, they serve as conduits of knowledge, making the state legible to migrants and 
making migrants visible to the state; on the other hand, they also serve as places for 
developing alternative navigation through migrants’ continued invisibility and 
clandestine mobility (explored in the following chapter). Migrant shelters exist at the 
juncture of official and unofficial cartographies, between permitted and clandestine 
movement as well as protection and exclusion.  
Spaces of Legibility and Visibility 
 
 During my eight weeks at the shelter, I learned that one of the primary tasks of 
staff was to give orientation to migrants regarding their rights as undocumented persons 
moving through Mexican territory. In recent years, this came to include orientation in 
how to the file of crime reports with the Fiscalía de Atención al Migrante (referred to as 
the fiscalía throughout this thesis), the state agency in charge of investigating crimes 
against migrants in Oaxaca, as well as filing paperwork to obtain Regularización por 
razones humanitarias (Regularization of Status for Humanitarian Reasons, called 
Regularización Humanitaria throughout this thesis) with the INM.19  
                                                 
19 There are many benefits to receiving Regularización Humanitaria. While the purpose of this temporary 
visitor status is to permit migrants to legally stay in Mexico while crimes committed against them are fully 
investigated, many migrants applied for this status for its additional benefits (legal work permit for one 
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According to one staff worker, some people who are making the journey north for 
the second or third time are already somewhat familiar with different authorities’ roles in 
enforcing immigration laws. Many people know which agencies are “safe” to approach 
for help (in theory, Grupo Beta, for instance), and which to avoid; some have openly 
challenged authorities attempting to extort them, citing their rights under the new 
Migration Law. However, those who were making the journey for the first time 
sometimes do not know the rights and resources available to them legally, making them 
less likely to report crimes committed against them. At the shelter, after conducting an 
initial interview with new guests, the office staff would provide such information to 
migrants in hopes of making their passage through Mexico safer.  
One of my informants who worked at the local Guatemalan consulate confirmed 
the vital role that third-party actors, such as shelter workers and advocates like himself, 
play in raising awareness of the resources offered by the state to migrants. He recounted 
that upon visiting albergues and detention centers in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, he was 
often approached by migrants of all nationalities who wanted to learn about their rights in 
the Mexican territory. Although he was an employee of the Guatemalan government and 
officially served his home country’s citizens, he shared information freely with everyone 
who was interested because “no one else is doing this.”   
                                                                                                                                                 
year, and ease of mobility throughout the country). The Regularziación Humanitaria was often colloquially 
referred to has a “humanitarian visa” (visa humanitaria). However, officially speaking, the humanitarian 
visa refers to an entirely different type of migration application. For more, see 
http://www.gob.mx/inm/acciones-y-programas/tramites-migratorios on the distinction between the 
regularización humanitaria and the visa humanitaria.  
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However, due to the growing number of people passing through shelters in recent 
years, he noted that it is nearly impossible to reach everyone. The shelter he visited in the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec was reported to be housing upwards of 150 people at a time 
during the summer of 2016, and the shelter staff and volunteers could barely keep up with 
basic tasks such as cooking food and attending to medical issues, leaving little time to 
screen for rights violations or to provide “Know Your Rights” workshops.  
Similarly, at the shelter where I volunteered, which housed far fewer migrants 
than the albergues of the Isthmus, it was difficult for the two office workers to speak with 
everyone who stayed at the shelter. One of the office staff said that if migrants do not 
approach her with specific questions, it is difficult to inform them of potential protections 
they might obtain. While shelters do strive to open doors to legal resources and 
protections that might enable migrants’ safe movement within the Mexican territory, they 
lack the funding and staffing to adequately do so. Their own marginal positioning within 
the state -- as under-resourced NGOs, reliant on donations and volunteer service -- limits 
their potential to increase migrants’ access to the rights afforded them.  
Even though the albergue where I volunteered was limited in its capacity to give 
all migrants legal orientation as they continued on their journeys, to the extent that was 
possible it made otherwise difficult or obscured state administrative procedures legible to 
migrants. For instance, in recent years, one of the most time-consuming tasks for shelter 
workers included assistance in filing for Regularización Humanitaria. Under Article 52 
of the 2011 Migration Law, migrants who are victims of or witnesses to grave crimes in 
Mexican territory can apply for temporary status for humanitarian reasons (Knippen et al. 
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2015, 44). The regularized temporary visitor status gives migrants legal standing to 
remain in Mexico for one year, with a work permit while the investigation of the crime is 
underway, and it can be renewed if necessary.20 Many migrants choose to obtain this type 
of visitor status in order to legally earn money in Mexico before continuing their journeys 
north, and to more quickly and safely travel north to the United States (with the 
protection of the temporary visitor status, they would not have to avoid INM 
checkpoints). 
Drawing on statistics from the INM, the Washington Office on Latin America 
noted that in 2013, only 277 “Tarjetas de Visitante por Razones Humanitarias” had been 
issued in Mexico (Knippen et al. 2015, 45). However, by 2015, the number of tarjetas 
requested had quintupled, rising to 1,481 for the first half of 2016 (January-June) 
(Knippen et al. 2015, 45). The increase in the issuance of this migration status might be 
attributed in large part to the support provided by albergues and other migration advocate 
organizations (Knippen et al. 2015, 44).  
Migrant advocates and shelter staff confirmed this was the case. One staff worker 
characterized the process to obtain the tarjeta is long and “illogical.” Because the forms 
are filled out and submitted online, migrants must have access to a computer to complete 
the process. Information is uploaded to an online form that is processed by the INM, and 
notifications on the status of the tarjeta are sent to the applicant through the online 
                                                 
20 In SEGOB’s Lineamientos para trámites y procedimientos migratorios, it is mentioned in vague terms 
that once the visitor status for humanitarian reasons has been granted, legal status in the country might be 
altered (presumably to become a permanent resident) (SEGOB August 8, 2012). However, during my 
fieldwork I had not heard of anyone pursuing this route to permanent residency in the country.  
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system. For someone who does not have easy web access, this process would be very 
difficult, if not impossible.  
Furthermore, advocates and shelter staff stated that the currency of their personal 
relationships with INM officials, developed through repeatedly filing of the tarjeta 
requests, increased their ability to help secure this protected status for migrants. While 
they attempted to help nearly all migrants with credible claims, shelter staff told me that 
they pre-screen potential applicants to make sure that their claims are legitimate, 
verifying their stories with a database shared by the other shelters. My informant at the 
Consulate of Guatemala said that the Regularización Humanitaria system is sometimes 
abused; on more than one occasion he has been asked to corroborate bogus claims (which 
he refuses to do). Thus, in order to protect the legitimacy of substantial claims, advocates 
are sometimes selective in which cases they choose to mediate (although they try to assist 
the majority of migrants filing tarjeta requests). By developing relationships of trust with 
INM office staff, they improve the likelihood of procuring the tarjeta humanitaria on 
behalf of applicants.  Because of their knowledge of how to maneuver through the online 
system and their personal relationships with individual officers of the INM, shelter staff 
play a crucial role in facilitating access to the legal protections afforded through the 
temporary visitor status.  
As places where migrants can receive orientation regarding their rights and 
potential avenues to increased mobility in the country, albergues might be seen as spaces 
of connection and opening into “official” state integration. Shelter workers and other 
advocates are relied upon to facilitate this process, making confusing or technical state 
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practices legible to migrants who might not otherwise be aware of their options. At the 
same time, they legitimate migrants’ claims before the state, facilitating their visibility in 
ways that are more likely to receive desired results. As Poole observed in the case of the 
margins of the state in the rural Andes, the “ ‘letter of the law’ is rendered curiously 
illegible, or opaque through the very processes and procedures that produces the 
documents that are its material expression” (Poole 2004, 62).  
The relevance of personal relationships between migrant advocates and the INM 
staff also points to the state’s embodiment in individuals, supporting Mountz’s argument 
that the state “emerges as a rather haphazard constellation of actors” -- with personal 
affinities and biases -- rather than just as a “monolithic” institution with a “coherent, 
hidden strategy” of exclusion (Mountz 2010, 88-89, 118). Everyday interactions between 
migration advocates and officials alter the officers’ attitudes towards migrants, in some 
cases improving the odds of issuance of the tarjeta humanitaria. One advocate 
commented that over the years, he has seen INM officials’ attitudes change: they have 
heard the stories, seen the golpes (wounds), visited the hospitals, and thus now have a 
better understanding that the threats against migrants are very real. Because of the trust 
established with government staff, advocates are able to leverage their relationships with 
the INM agents and fiscalía so that they follow through with the investigation of 
migrants’ claims.  
However, despite the shelter workers’ attempts to illuminate the otherwise opaque 
procedure of obtaining a tarjeta humanitaria, the path is still very uncertain for migrants 
who must navigate these administrative borders. In the following section, I outline the 
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steps involved in achieving Regularización Humanitaria. I argue that while migrants 
must work to get their narratives “straight” -- that is, fit for presentation to the INM with 
all the appropriate forms and documents -- they also must travel through a winding and 
confusing process that, in many instances, discourages them from exercising the rights 
they are entitled to.  
Mapping the Regularización Humanitaria Process 
 
From what I observed in my two months of volunteering at the shelter, the steps 
to obtain the tarjeta were by no means clear or consistent. It took the duration of my 
fieldwork before I finally grasped what paperwork was necessary for presentation at 
which agency, in which town or city. Even after hearing the basic steps repeated by 
shelter staff multiple times, I remained confused why certain applicants seemed to have 
extra steps to complete, or why some people had to return south, retracing their steps to 
earlier points in their journey, in order to move through the regularización process.  
What I pieced together through several conversations with shelter workers, 
migrant advocates and migrants was that there were two agencies involved, the state-
level fiscalía (Fiscalía de Atención al Migrante), the agency where the crime report 
would first be filed, and the INM, which processes the request for the tarjeta de visitante 
por razones humanitarias (referred to throughout as the tarjeta or tarjeta humanitaria). 
After migrants experience or witness a grave assault (which, according to advocates, 
happens with frequency in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec), they must file a report with the 
local fiscalía. In Oaxaca, this agency has offices in Chahuites and Ixtepec, both located in 
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the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The crime report must be filed close to where the incident 
occurred (for instance, if the assault occurred near Chahuites, near the border of Oaxaca 
and Chiapas, complainants would have to file at the office there).  
Most migrants with whom I spoke would then stay at the albergue in Ixtepec or 
Chahuites while carrying out the first steps in the investigative process, which included 
visiting the scene of the crime with someone from the fiscalía office.21  After the initial 
interview and revisiting of the assault site, the fiscalía would give the complainant a 
signed document confirming that the investigation of their case was underway. Furnished 
with this official document legitimizing their claim, migrants could then solicit the tarjeta 
humanitaria at an INM office to regularize their migration status.   
Most people I spoke with would apply for the Regularización Humanitaria in 
either Salina Cruz, a port city located in the Isthmus, or in the capital, Oaxaca de Juárez. 
Before visiting the INM office, they would need to fill out and print an online form that 
included details of the assault, and also print a copy of their passport (as mentioned 
earlier, this was usually carried out with the assistance of shelter staff). Once they had 
completed the online form, they would wait to be notified of their in-person interview, 
the first of three required visits to the INM offices.  
Upon the first visit to the INM office, applicants are supposed to bring: a printed 
copy and an original version of their passport or other official identifying document; an 
original document from a public institution that indicates the applicant had filed for an 
                                                 
21 Although legally speaking, migrants could report a crime at another ministerio público office, I was told 
that migrants were usually directed to carry this process out at the Fiscalía de Atención al Migrante since 
they specialized in investigating crimes against migrants.  
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investigation of a grave crime (usually from the fiscalía); and a printed copy of the online 
form to request the Regularización Humanitaria. At this interview, INM officials would 
determine if a small perfunctory fine would be imposed, ostensibly for the administrative 
infraction of crossing into Mexican territory without permission.22 After all the 
documents are received, applicants would be notified of their second appointment to take 
their photograph and record their fingerprints. Finally, once that information has been 
processed through a centralized database, applicants are notified a third time to visit the 
INM office to finally receive the tarjeta.  
From the time of submitting the online form, migrants have 90 days to complete 
all the steps required in the Regularización Humanitaria process. During this time, they 
might try to secure any missing documents, such as a copy of the passport or other 
government issued identifying document. The migrant advocate at the Guatemalan 
consulate said this requirement created a significant hurdle to many applicants, many of 
whose documents might have been stolen or lost during the reported assault or earlier in 
their journey. To assist co-nationals in this situation, the consulate began issuing a 
substitute document -- a constancia de origen --, which includes the name, photograph 
and other identifying information of the applicant, as well as the seal of the Guatemalan 
government. Oftentimes the INM office would contact him to verify that these constancia 
documents were not false, again pointing to the pivotal role that third-party migrant 
advocates play in legitimizing migrants’ claims.  
                                                 
22 See Articles 73 and 145 of the 2011 Migration Law for more.  
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Importantly, migrants make themselves visible to the state through the papers they 
fill out and carry. A lack of adequate documentation might result in detention if stopped 
at a checkpoint, or immobility in the administrative process of obtaining a tarjeta 
humanitaria. As Poole writes in her study on movement through checkpoints in the 
Peruvian Andes, the “lived geography of [the] state…-like the paperwork itself- is never 
fixed or stable” from the perspective of those in the margins (Poole 2004, 36). Required 
paperwork becomes the state’s means to maintain marginality, creating an “uncertain 
geography” that difficult to decipher without an intermediary, who often must serve as a 
bridge to state inclusion. Even with the guidance and resources of third party advocates, 
the administrative process to obtain protection via Regularización Humanitaria is lengthy 
and exhausting, and often requires further journeying through state margins -- both 




As Mountz writes in the case of asylum-seekers, “temporality is often 
conceptualized as waiting, limbo or suspension. These temporal zones map onto 
corresponding spatial ambiguities theorized [here] as liminality, exception and threshold” 
(Mountz 2011, abstract).  Similarly, Hyndman and Giles (2017) and Ehrkamp (2016) 
theorize that refugees waiting for asylum status experience an “ontological insecurity,” 
creating zones of exception tied to temporality. My fieldwork corroborates these 
scholars’ arguments: in the case of migration through southern Mexico, margins were 
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often experienced as spatial-temporal zones that had to be journeyed through at the 
applicant's’ risk in order to be formally granted state protection. 
Shelter workers whom I interviewed admitted that most requested tarjetas were 
eventually issued. However, the time to receive the Regularización of their migration 
status varied greatly -- from two weeks to two months -- for reasons that were unclear to 
many waiting through the process. This indefinite wait time, as well as continued 
movement in spaces of uncertainty and risk, perpetuated applicants’ restriction to the 
margins and reinforced the partiality of their inclusion in state protection.23  
Advocates from a nearby shelter mentioned that one of the biggest changes they 
noticed in recent years was the time it was taking for migrants to move through the 
region. Before Programa Frontera Sur, migrants would stay at their shelter three to five 
days; now, many migrants would end up staying one month or more, in part to wait 
through the Regularización Humanitaria process. Another staff worker where I 
volunteered confirmed this was the case at their shelter: although many migrants did 
indeed receive the tarjeta if they requested it, many chose not to pursue that route to 
formal state inclusion because of the time it takes to collect the appropriate documents, 
obtain an appointment with the INM, and wait for the paperwork to process.  
According to some migrants with whom I spoke, the process was not so much 
difficult as it was frustrating. One man from Guatemala mentioned that he had filed his 
paperwork over one month ago and was still waiting to receive his tarjeta; he had met 
                                                 
23 As a result, many migrating people felt that it was not worth their time to pursue such a route, and 
instead carried on with their journeys through informal means (discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4). 
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others who filed their paperwork at the same time he had, but received their tarjetas 
within two weeks. It was frustrating to not know why this was the case, and the opacity 
of the administration of tarjetas was experienced as illogical and arbitrary.  
Several people staying at the shelter mentioned that in addition to the time spent 
waiting for their paperwork to process, they also had to wait for that of their family 
members who might be held up at different points in the migration route. One woman 
told me that she had received her tarjeta, and was now only waiting for her son to receive 
his. Another long-term guest at the shelter had successfully petitioned for refugee status 
in Mexico -- a separate, reportedly more difficult and lengthy process than applying for 
Regularización Humanitaria -- but was now waiting for the state to extend this status to 
his wife and children, who were held up in the southern border city of Tapachula, 
Chiapas. Even after they were individually given formal state protection through the 
Regularización Humanitaria or the granting of refugee/asylum status, they had to 
mentally move through the process again on behalf of their family members, doubling 
the uncertainty experienced in navigating the administrative borders of the state.  
To obtain the legal protections they were due after suffering violence in Mexican 
national territory, migrants were required to wait, indefinitely, in one place while their 
papers processed and interview was scheduled. But for some, slowing down the pace of 
movement came at a cost; in some instances, lost momentum allowed doubt of fear to 
interfere with previous plans. One woman said that after suffering an assault and then 
moving through the complicated journey to obtain the correct paperwork to request the 
Regularización Humanitaria, she’d had enough time to reconsider their plans to cross the 
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US-Mexico border. Maybe it would be even more difficult than this -- maybe it would be 
more dangerous than what they had already experienced? Perhaps these doubts would 
have surfaced even if she had continued her journey north without waiting through the 
Regularización Humanitaria process, but in the empty hours at the albergue with little to 
do, waiting for news about their tarjetas, she had ample time to oscillate between options.  
Spatial Margins 
 
The temporal margins experienced in waiting for the Regularización Humanitaria 
process to complete corresponds with the spatial margins of safety and danger, as well as 
legality and illegality, that characterize border-making in southern Mexico.  Under 
certain circumstances, rest, refuge and increased mobility are afforded under the 2011 
Migration Law. However, these protections are precarious; they are not easy or 
straightforward to obtain.  
According to Article 76 of the 2011 Migration Law, INM agents who manage the 
border region checkpoints cannot ask to verify migration status in albergues or other civil 
society organizations offering humanitarian services to migrants -- in other words, INM 
agents cannot conduct immigration “raids” at albergues, where they know many 
undocumented migrants are staying. While there have been violations of this article by 
INM officials, the law has provided grounds for complaint by civil society organizations 
(“Mas de 60 organizaciones…” 2013).  
However, what remains more ambiguous is the legality of INM agents to detain 
undocumented migrants just outside of or nearby the albergues. The Padre at the 
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albergue where I volunteered said he maintained a good relationship with the INM and 
informally established an agreement that they would not wait for migrants to exit the 
albergue to be “caught.” He has noted, however, that the INM might station nearby if 
there had been suspicion that someone had committed a crime in the city. In short, the 
albergue’s status as a space of refuge is negotiated and maintained through political clout 
and personal relationships between migrant advocates and INM officials, confirming the 
importance of advocates in ensuring respect of migrants’ rights. However, even with this 
leverage, it is still largely at the INM’s discretion how generously this “safe refuge” 
clause of the Migration Law is applied.  
MOBILITY THROUGH THE MARGINS 
 
 For many migrants, applying for Regularización Humanitaria was a guarantee of 
legal protection against their detention by INM agents in Mexico, whether they decide to 
stay in the country or to continue migrating north. However, as explained earlier, the 
process of obtaining this protection is confusing and lengthy; in many instances, migrants 
were required to move in circles in order to secure legal status in the country. They often 
had to take on certain risks -- and costs -- in order to access the protections granted 
through Regularización.  
It was often the case that upon arriving at the shelter where I volunteered, 
migrants who were qualified to receive the tarjeta humanitaria would have to retrace 
their steps, going back to the location where the crime had occurred, to report it to the 
local fiscalía and submit their paperwork to the nearest INM office. This backwards-
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forwards journeying through the Regularización process was the cause of much stress for 
migrants and advocates alike during the period of my fieldwork. Migrants were receiving 
conflicting information about where to process their paperwork: many of them reported 
crimes committed against them at the fiscalía’s office in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, but 
were told to process their paperwork for the Regularización Humanitaria at the INM 
office in Oaxaca de Juárez because the office in Salina Cruz, in the Isthmus, was 
overburdened and could not process the quantity of requests arriving at once. This 
produced considerable confusion for the shelter staff where I was volunteering, as they 
were not prepared to host the number of migrants arriving from the Isthmus, most of 
whom needed to stay at the shelter until they received the tarjeta.  
Upon arriving at our shelter, many of these applicants were told to go back to the 
Isthmus to complete their paperwork, as it was standard procedure to apply for the tarjeta 
at the office nearest the incident of assault. For some, the risks and costs of retracing their 
steps was a deterrent to pursuing the Regularización Humanitaria at all.24 One shelter 
staff worker explained that upon learning that they would have to return to the place 
where the assault had occurred, many migrants chose not to continue with the application 
process, instead continuing north without the legal protections they were qualified to 
receive. My informant at the Consulate of Guatemala confirmed this and added that many 
                                                 
24 Although it was not mentioned by any of migrant informants, other organizations and albergues have 
reported that INM agents and Mexican state and federal security forces are responsible for many of the 
crimes committed against migrants. In its evaluation of complaints received from 2010 to 2015, the CNDH 
(Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, National Human Rights Commission) found that from 2014 to 
2015, following the implementation of Programa Frontera Sur, there was a 53% increase in complaints 
filed against INM agents, and a 36% increase in complaints filed against the Federal Police. In this same 
time period, complaints filed by migrants specifically increased by 31%. For more, see 
http://informe.cndh.org.mx/menu.aspx?id=279 . 
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migrants, after receiving a case number from the INM (which would give them temporary 
permit to be in the country for up to 90 days to complete the regularización) would try to 
reach the U.S.-Mexico border within that time period without trying to secure the tarjeta 
and the full legal status and benefits afforded to them under the law. Others who had not 
begun the Regularización Humanitaria process but had denounced the crime at a local 
fiscalía might try to do the same, not realizing that their temporary permit lasted only 15 
days. If stopped outside of that timeframe by INM officials, they could be subject to 
detention and deportation.  
For some migrants, retracing their routes to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec meant 
they would have to pay for transportation that would otherwise be spent moving north, 
towards their ultimate destination. It also meant that they were at increased risk of 
suffering yet another assault or robbery -- even with a temporary permit to be in the 
country, they would have to travel back through places where crimes against migrants 
were fairly common, with impunity. Thus, the complicated process of obtaining the 
official state protections they were legally due became a labyrinthian journey, moving in 
and out of spaces of precarity and marginality.  
Knowing that many migrants would not stay and wait through the investigative 
process, law enforcement often chose not to fully investigate the crimes reported. The 
staff worker at the Consulate of Guatemala stated that oftentimes the fiscalía assumed 
that because the victims of crimes in the Isthmus had already left the region, presumably 
continuing their journey north, there was little point in carrying out the investigation or 
convicting suspected perpetrators. My informant said that on more than one occasion, he 
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himself had asked for updates on cases, demanding to know what progress had been 
made in preventing these crimes from continuing. The initial response of the fiscalía was 
that these cases had been closed because the migrants had left the region. However, under 
his persistent pressure, two arrests were made (although he emphasized that these were 
only two arrests in two years).  
INTERMITTENT AND OSCILLATING PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN THE MARGINS 
 
This reluctance of state officials to fully ensure migrants’ rights functions as 
intermittent contact of the state in the margins. On the one hand, the state is highly 
visible, with INM checkpoints set up throughout the Isthmus, as explained in the previous 
chapter. However, the fact that many crimes are committed against migrants with 
impunity, even when law enforcement is known to have a significant presence in the 
region, demonstrates how the state selectively serves as a resource for and protector of 
migrants. Although there are offices dedicated to combatting crimes against migrants 
(like the fiscalía office), it is at their discretion whether or not they complete the 
investigation of the crimes. Migrants anticipate this partial protection by the state, and 
many choose not to exercise their right to seeing their cases fully investigated because 
they do not believe it will result in any real change.  
For instance, I had asked one woman if she felt safer traveling along the migration 
route with such a visible presence of security officials. She laughed, and responded that 
she wouldn’t count on them providing protection unless she had money to pay them. Her 
skepticism was shared by many migrants I met at the shelter, as extortion by government 
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officials is commonplace throughout Mexico (“Continúan las extorsiones…” 2014; 
REDODEM 2014; REDODEM 2015; Vogt 2013). From the perspective of the margins, 
it seemed that the state’s purpose and presence oscillated between protection and 
exploitation. In another man’s account, branches of the INM, like Grupo Beta (intended 
to offer orientation, food and emergency resources to migrants traveling without 
documentation) might offer migrants food and aid in one moment, and then five minutes 
later notify other INM officers of the migrants’ location, so that they might be 
apprehended and deported.  
These varied encounters with the state contribute to a shifting topography of the 
state of exception, creating a landscape of uncertainty for those granted access to only a 
partial inclusion. The uncertainty produced through these oscillating and intermittent 
forms of contact with the state contributed to migrants’ reluctance to exercise their rights 
to the fullest, and in some instances encouraged them to continue their journeys north 
invisibly, without official protections of the state.  
As Das and Poole (2004) assert, from the perspective of the margins, the state 
administrative procedures appear as illegible or “illogical.” Even with the mediating 
assistance of third party advocates, migrants must indefinitely wait through lengthy 
processes, or travel backwards, through dangerous or costly routes, in order to eventually 
move ahead, towards inclusion in the legal folds of the state. The intermittent presence of 
the state -- sometimes as a protector, sometimes as a danger -- generates a landscape of 
confusion that makes mobility in the margins of the state all the more difficult.  
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Mountz might argue that this opacity and illegibility might also be experienced 
within the state’s own bureaucracies. However, based on the perspective of those on the 
periphery of the state -- those who must navigate its territorial and administrative borders 
-- the state’s seeming inability to consistently, effectively and “logically” facilitate the 
means for migrants to be incorporated into its protection betrays a certain apathy towards 
their plight, if not an intentional, systematic orientation to keep migrants perpetually in 
the margins.  
In the situation of migrants applying for the Regularización Humanitaria, the 
unpredictable encounters with the state in the migration route function as “techniques of 
[its] power… [T]he exception operates as a potential (dis)ordering principle”: as migrants 
travel back and forth between government offices, in varying states of legality and safety, 
the borders between the inside and outside of the state are blurred (Belcher et al. 2008). 
Furthermore, their movement through this uncertain landscape characterizes their 
journeys as precarious, as points of access to state inclusion open and close depending on 
what documents and signatures they carry. Because of this precarity, many migrants 
choose to continue their journeys without obtaining all the protections they are due under 
the law; they develop alternative cartographies to navigate the state, as explained further 





Chapter IV: Margins as Creative Spaces / The Production of 
Alternative Geographies in Oaxaca  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Although margins are often sites of illegibility, opacity and uncertainty for those 
who are not fully incorporated into the legal folds of the state, they are also creative 
spaces where “alternative forms of political actions are instituted” (Das and Poole 2004, 
19). In the case of migration through Mexico under Programa Frontera Sur, migrants 
achieved this by maintaining invisibility and choosing to remain illegible to the state, 
while creating and sharing new clandestine cartographies for moving north.  
Albergues are places where migrants can (somewhat) safely access the state, but 
they are also places where migrants can develop and share unofficial mappings of 
migration routes, exercising their own agency producing new social terrains (Rodríguez 
& Jonas 2014). Using invisibility as a tactic, many migrants choose to avoid the uncertain 
and lengthy processes of becoming visible to the state, and opt to continue moving north 
without the benefits of a temporary visitor status -- which many are qualified to receive -- 
in Mexico.   
Additionally, this chapter looks at the ways that the relative marginality of the 
southern border region and of Oaxaca, in particular, overlaps with the marginality of the 
migration routes. Over the summer, I observed how tactics of resistance generated on a 
regional scale inadvertently created openings for migrants’ increased mobility along 
informal routes. By bringing attention to this overlap of margins, it might be possible to 
identify potential room for alliances that reach across distinct demographics and scales. 
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ALBERGUES AS PLACES OF INTERSECTION IN THE MARGINS  
 
 While the albergue where I conducted fieldwork functioned as a key access point 
to state incorporation, usually with the assistance of migrant advocates, it also served as a 
place of intersection between formal and informal cartographies. Many people who 
arrived at the shelter did not have a concrete plan as to how they would continue their 
trajectories north. We would often pass the time looking at one of the many maps of 
Mexico posted on the walls of the shelter, connecting cities and albergues between them 
on the way to the U.S.-Mexico border.  
For instance, after giving a presentation on migrants’ legal rights upon entering 
the U.S., one woman approached me to ask if I thought it would be safer to enter the U.S. 
through Laredo, TX, or closer to Tijuana. I was unprepared to give her an answer, not 
simply because I was completely ignorant of the actual process of border crossing, but 
also because I had assumed most people had already planned their trajectory through 
Mexico. In retrospect, it makes sense that in a constantly shifting landscape of mobile 
checkpoints, unpredictable encounters with law enforcement, and other numerous factors, 
plans would have to remain flexible, open to revision at a moment’s notice. While these 
revisions sometimes included obtaining formal state protection through Regularización 
Humanitaria, they often involved skirting around formal passage points, or moving in 
and out of the state’s line of sight.  
Shelter workers told me that migrants usually conferred among themselves to 
share information on how to continue north. It was not uncommon for people to meet for 
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the first time at the shelter and then continue their journeys together, at least for portions 
of their routes. I spoke with one woman and daughter from El Salvador who ended up 
leaving the shelter with someone who they met there, migrating from Nicaragua. All 
three of them traveled from the albergue to Mexico City, where they worked and lived 
together, temporarily, to save money for the rest of their prospective travels to the U.S. 
Their plans were formed spontaneously, from a chance encounter en route.  
It was also common to arrive at the shelter to find that the dozen or so people who 
were there the night before -- some of whom might be in the process of obtaining the 
tarjeta humanitaria -- had all decided to leave that morning. Shelter staff accepted these 
abrupt changes as routine, and acknowledged that they were not often informed of where 
and how people were choosing to continue their journeys. They assumed that information 
had been shared among those staying at the shelter, and perhaps it was an opportune 
moment to leave -- albeit along informal paths. Opting out of formal passage into the 
state vis the Regularización Humanitaria process, and thereby opting out of being made 
visible and legible to the state, many migrants chose to continue moving north 
clandestinely, generating alternatives to state induction in order to maintain mobility.  
OVERLAP OF MARGINS: OAXACA AS A MARGINAL SPACE 
 
 During the course of my fieldwork, I also observed how creativity in migration 
was enhanced through the overlap of marginal spaces. The CNTE teachers’ protests, 
which had been ongoing since 2013, but culminated in violent clashes with the federal 
police on June 19, 2016, produced waves of reactions among residents of the region, 
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inadvertently creating openings to unofficial migration routes. In this section of the 
chapter, I explore the ways that the relative marginality of Oaxaca, exemplified in part 
through the state repression that occurred the summer of 2016, intersected with the 
geographies of migration in unexpected but generative ways. Namely, protestors’ 
responses to neoliberal policies and state violence25 -- enacted through the hyper-
visibilization of their own marginal status -- enhanced migrants’ invisibility as they 
slipped through protest blockades and around police checkpoints.  
 
History of Oaxaca as Margins of the State 
 
 Oaxaca, and southern Mexico in general, has long been considered marginal in 
terms of its high poverty rates and racist, repressive treatment of its indigenous majority 
population (Gibler 2007; Hernández Castillo 2008; Ruiz Cervantes & Traffano 2006; 
Stephen 2002).26 Oaxaca is often characterized as having a strong culture and history of 
resistance, in part due to its economic and ethnic marginalization and repressive 
treatment by the federal government (Rénique 2007; Rénique and Poole 2008).27 Local 
                                                 
25 For more on the rise of neoliberalism and authoritarian repression and state violence in Mexico, see 
Blanca Cordero Díaz’s and Carlos Figueroa Ibarra’s chapter “Triturando a la humanidad: capitalismo, 
violencia y migración en el tránsito por México" in Migración, seguridad, violencia y derechos humanos.  
26 Around 70% of the population in the states of Oaxaca, Chiapas and Guerrero live in poverty, compared 
to the national average of 46.2% of the Mexican population (Aguillera 2016).  According to a 2015 INEGI 
survey, 13.3% of Oaxaca’s population above the age of 15 could not read or write, compared to the national 
average of 5.5% (INEGI 2015). Scholars have noted the correlation between the state’s high indigenous 
population (around 32% of the population speaks an indigenous language, and around 65% self-identify as 
indigenous) and the high rates of poverty and inequality (INEGI 2015; Rénique and Poole 2008). 
27 It is often remembered in public discourse that Oaxaca successfully ousted three corrupt or unpopular 
governors (in 1947,1952 and 1974) (Rénique 2007). Some indigenous communities had even successfully 
cut ties with the Oaxacan state government for certain periods of time in order to maintain local autonomy 
(Stephen 2002). Several movements for local autonomy and secession occurred in early to mid-19th 
century as well as in the early 20th century. In the 1970s, an opposition government was organized by a 
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indigenous organizing against land dispossession, the imposition of extractive industries 
or lack of consultation over land has persisted for decades (López Bárcenas 2013; Matias 
2017).  
The beginning of the teachers’ movement in Oaxaca has been traced to 1980, 
when the local union, Sección 22, then of the SNTE (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores 
de la Educación, the National Union of Education Workers) was reformed, breaking with 
its prior PRI alliance to function more autonomously (Gibler 2007).28 Many leaders of the 
Local 22 come from rural, indigenous communities in Oaxaca and participate in 
collective organizing on a range of progressive issues; teachers have often played a 
fundamental role in community politics in marginalized spaces of Oaxaca. 
The teachers’ movement gained widespread international attention in 2006, in 
what came to be called “The Oaxaca Uprising” (Gibler 2007). After failed negotiations 
with Governor Ruiz to increase rural teachers’ wages and financial support for their 
students, members of Sección 22 set up an encampment in Oaxaca’s city center. In an 
effort to oust the encampment, police squads attacked the protesters without 
announcement. However, their plan backfired: “an estimated 300,000 people [ -- many 
unaffiliated with the teachers’ union --] took to the streets out of a sense of … pride and 
indignation … joining the teachers and calling for the governor’s resignation, and the end 
                                                                                                                                                 
coalition of students, campesinos, workers and indigenous communities, concentrated in the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec. Organized struggles for indigenous cultural recognition and autonomy have continued from 
the late-1960s to the present. For more, see Stephen 2002.  
28 Today, Sección 22 pertains to the CNTE, the more radical faction of the national teachers’ union that has 
led the resistance to neoliberal education reform. 
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to repression and corruption” (Favela 2010, 66).29 The resistance was eventually broken 
by federal police in tanks, helicopters and bulldozers, and although some compromises 
were attained, “many of the issues that led to the rebellion remain[ed] unresolved” 
(Favela 2010, 68-69). 
The Teachers’ Movement of 2016 
 
Scholars Rénique and Poole argue that the teachers’ movement of 2016 is not a 
mere continuation of the 2006 popular uprising, but rather is the culmination of ongoing 
marginalization, neglect and growing resentment toward the federal government 
(Rénique and Poole 2016). In 2013, President Enrique Peña Nieto’s administration 
adopted an education reform bill that would create standardized teaching evaluations, 
reducing the power of the normals -- the local teacher schools that serve young, 
campesino teachers and tend to foster more leftist politics (Asmann 2016) –, effectively 
shifting power away from the teachers’ union to the federal government.30 The reform, 
which opens public education in Mexico to private investment, was developed along with 
a series of privatization measures that impacted the energy and health sectors, expanded 
                                                 
29 Days later, this coalition of protesters formed the APPO -- the Oaxaca People’s Popular Assembly -- 
initially convoked by the teachers’ union, but eventually incorporating hundreds of organizations and 
previously unaffiliated individuals into a massive grassroots movement (Gibler 2007). The Assembly was 
able to eventually “take control of the city, force the governor out of the palace, and blockade the streets to 
prevent police from entering the center” (Favela 2010, 67). Despite the popular outcry against the governor, 
the state government refused to allow his removal, and instead responded by organizing paramilitary and 
police attacks on protesters, killing an estimated 13 people from August to November 2006 (Gibler 2007). 
30 Rénique and Poole write that the education reform stemmed from a 2008 agreement between Mexico 
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), later approved as part of a 
World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment package that formed part of Enrique Peña Nieto’s broader 
neoliberal project (Rénique and Poole 2016). 
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foreign access to mineral and water resources, and deregulated the telecommunications 
and financial industries (Rénique and Poole 2016).31  
It is likely that foreign capital’s consolidation of power in Mexico will gain 
momentum with the construction of infrastructural corridors, called “special economic 
zones” (SEZs), meant to spur large scale development in regions like the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec (Renique & Poole 2016).32 The federal government has stated that the 
projects will “overcome the lags in the south of Mexico” -- presumably bridging the gap 
in inequality --, but many leaders of indigenous communities and local social 
organizations disagree (Presidencia de la República, Oct. 1, 2015).33  
 Hence, in addition to the teacher union’s reaction to the education reform bill, 
growing resentment over a number of these neoliberal projects contributed to large-scale 
protests that erupted during the summer of 2016. As in 2006, the events were initiated by 
the teachers’ union, which had been regularly protesting the education reform bill since 
2013. In the spring of 2016, protests escalated as union leaders were targeted by state and 
federal governments and over 3,000 protesting teachers in Guerrero, Oaxaca and 
Michoacan were fired (Asmann 2016). Blockades of main highways and an encampment 
                                                 
31 “Provisions for the privatization and financialization of public education, for example, will force poor 
parents to pay for their children's public schooling while simultaneously funneling public resources into 
private education. At the same time, energy and economic reforms will provide unbridled access to mineral 
and hydraulic resources in indigenous territories, while simultaneously excluding local communities from 
participation in the profits of unregulated infrastructural development, mining, and other extractivist 
industries that exploit those resources” (Rénique and Poole 2016).  
32 The SEZs will be geared especially for the energy sector, and include plans for a transoceanic gas 
pipeline, as well as an transisthmus railway and highway that will cross through southern Mexico.  
33 For example, EDUCA, a non-profit focused on informing local Oaxacan communities of their rights and 
fostering political participation, has recently denounced the SEZs, stating that they are projects intended to 
benefit the international capital and the Mexican elite rather than local communities, and pose a direct 
threat to local ways of life (EDUCA 2017). 
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in the center of Oaxaca de Juárez were tactics used by protesters to disrupt business as 
usual.  
On June 19, 2016, an estimated 800 federal and state police mobilized to lift the 
blockades and the city-center encampment resulting in violent confrontations across the 
state (Roldán and Martínez 2016). In the town of Nochixtlán, 50 miles north of the 
capital city, clashes with police resulted in 9 civilian deaths (Roldán and Martínez 2016). 
Protesters set up blockades around the city center in the capital, anticipating further 
police violence that night. There were reports that the electricity had been shut off in 
various parts of the city to make it difficult to document any violent activity. State 
intimidation remained constant in the days that followed: helicopters circled low over the 
city center, and on June 26, a community radio journalist critical of the Nochixtlán 
attacks was killed (Muñoz 2016).  
The day after the Nochixtlán killings, thousands of Oaxacans participated in a 
mega-march in the capital. Families and students joined the protesting teachers, 
denouncing the state violence. The rest of the summer, countless events were held in 
support of Nochixtlán and the teachers. Regional highway blockades remained fixed 
throughout the state, blocking vehicle access on the highways north to Puebla as well as 
through the isthmus and to the coast. It was in this context that I began my fieldwork on 




CREATIVE RESISTANCE IN OAXACA: REVERSING MOBILITY IN THE MARGINS 
 
 Since I arrived at the shelter, conversations among staff workers pivoted around 
the ongoing blockades and protests. There was a fear that at any moment, violence might 
erupt. Migrants leaving the shelter for daily errands or short-term work were warned to 
take extra precautions, and to stay away from the city center. However, even as the law 
enforcement swarmed the city, many migrants were able to move through the protests 
and blockades, which had inadvertently increased their invisibility in the days following 
the attacks.  
 The creativity produced through these protests and acts of resistance increased 
migrants’ mobility, permitting access to new, informal routes north. Blockades were set 
up strategically throughout the state: on the highway from Oaxaca de Juárez to Puebla; 
along the federal highway Panamericana, which continues from the isthmus to Chiapas; 
and on highways leading to tourist destinations and the port city of Salina Cruz, on the 
Pacific coast (Pérez Alfonso & Manzo 2016).   
Visibility of Security, State Violence and Commercial Interests 
 
It was reported that many blockades were permitting the passage of small, private 
vehicles, but those pertaining to large corporations -- such as Coca-Cola or PEMEX -- 
were not permitted to pass through (Larson 2016). The intention of the protesters was 
clear. The best way to make their demands legible to the state was by disrupting the flows 
that were privileged by the state: flows of transnational capital, most of which 
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represented elite interests over those of the marginalized. The disruption of transnational 
trade through the blocking of commercial vehicles along state highways achieved the 
desired effect. They made protesters hyper-visible, garnering attention internationally, as 
well as across Mexico, while at the same time they incurred incredible costs to the elite 
beneficiaries of President Peña Nieto’s neoliberal economic development projects. 
PEMEX issued a statement apologizing to their clients for the delays in deliveries of 
gasoline, and that if the blockades were to continue they would have to shut down the 
refinery in Salina Cruz (“Si continúan los bloqueos…” 2016).   
The hypervisibility of the ongoing protests and blockades also returned attention 
to the use of Mérida Initiative funding in state repression, connecting the deployment of 
the gendarmerie in Oaxaca with the controversial 2008 security agreement (Knoll Soloff 
2016).34 A demand for state protection of commercial interests was demonstrated in the 
Salina Cruz oil refinery’s request for federal security forces to remove the highway 
blockades in the Isthmus (“Si continúan los bloqueos…” 2016). On a separate occasion, 
in July 2016, the president of the regional Proprietors’ Union of Renewable Energy, 
partnered with a controversial wind energy company Eólica del Sur, demanded that the 
federal government take a stronger stand against protesters, applying a “mano dura” 
(strong hand) to regain control of the highways to ensure the success of economic 
development projects in the Isthmus (Bracamontes 2016). The state’s privileging of its 
                                                 
34 The gendarmerie is a specialized federal police force, made up partially of former army and navy 
soldiers, created in 2014. It has received Mérida Initiative funding, and certain troops have received joint 
border enforcement training with the U.S. Customs and Border Enforcement. For more, see 
https://www.cb...eceives-honor .  
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commercial relationships reflect observations made by journalist Dawn Paley in her book 
Drug War Capitalism:  
rather than stopping the flow of drugs, funding the drug war has bolstered 
a war strategy that ensures transnational corporations access to resources 
through dispossession and terror… in this war, terror is used against the 
populations in cities and rural areas, and… parallel to this terror and 
resulting panic, policies that facilitate foreign direct investment and 
economic growth are implemented (Paley 2014, 15-16).   
 
In the teachers’ movement of 2016, state violence was not used to geographically 
displace protesters and their communities, but it was used to reinforce policies that would 
economically and politically displace many who lived in rural communities in Oaxaca. 
Journalist Knoll Soloff noted that “the Mérida Initiative, which has funded helicopters, 
police dogs and training programs for thousands of Mexican police officers, has enabled 
intensifying repression of civil society by the state. The deadly confrontation between 
police and protesters in June is the latest example” (2016). 
Visibility through the Breakdown and Reversal 
 
As infrastructure ethnographer Susan Star theorized, infrastructure “becomes 
visible upon breakdown: the normally invisible quality of working infrastructure becomes 
visible when it breaks: the server is down, the bridge washes out, there is a power 
blackout” (Star 1993, 382). In the case of Oaxaca, through the blockading of highways 
protesters made neoliberal processes (like the transnational transportation of privileged 
capital) visible to the wider public.  
It could also be argued that the protesters’ blockades functioned like checkpoints, 
permitting certain vehicles to pass while prohibiting others from moving forward. In 
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some ways, they mimic the INM and Federal Police retenes (checkpoints) set up 
throughout southern Mexico, which are intended to sift permitted and prohibited flows of 
people and goods through the region. However, in the case of the protesters’ blockades, 
the prohibited and permitted flows were reversed: transnational capital, which is granted 
privileged mobility along state highways, was curbed, while the flows of individual 
people -- including migrants -- was, for the most part, permitted. Thus, the highway 
blockades brought attention to the types of mobilities desired by the state and at the same 
time unintentionally obscured the clandestine mobilities the state had sought to control 
under Programa Frontera Sur.  
Disrupting Official Routes, Creating Clandestine Ones 
 
 The protests and blockades not only impeded the traffic of commercial goods, but 
also the traffic of visa requests through the INM’s administrative branches. In the weeks 
following the Nochixtlán attacks, it became very difficult -- if not impossible -- for 
documentation to travel between INM offices, causing a disruption in the normal 
procedures of issuing the tarjeta. Ironically, the administrative process that was normally 
fraught with confusion and difficulty was made more convenient for some applicants.  
For instance, one man with whom I spoke said he and his son had applied for 
Regularización Humanitaria in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, but were told to travel ahead 
to Oaxaca de Juárez to finish the process. Like many migrants, upon arriving in the city 
they were informed that they needed to return to the Isthmus to receive the tarjeta from 
the office where they had begun the application. However, because of the blockades, they 
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argued that would not be able to easily return to the Isthmus. The INM administrators 
conceded, and made an exception to the usual bureaucratic rules: the tarjeta would be 
received in Oaxaca de Juárez so they did not have to make the journey south through the 
blockades. As a result, the father and son did not have to take the risks or pay the costs of 
retracing their steps.  
 However, it was more often the case that migrants took advantage of the 
distraction caused by the blockades to leave the city and travel north. In the first days of 
the protests following the Nochixtlán attack, the shelter was practically empty. Almost all 
the migrants who had stayed there over the weekend had left, presumably towards 
Mexico City. I asked the shelter staff if they thought the protests and blockades would be 
a problem for the migrants who left the shelter, but they believed that, on the contrary, 
the blockades were providing an ideal opportunity for continuing their journeys.  
A few days later I spoke with a woman who had travelled with her daughter from 
the Isthmus to Oaxaca de Juárez. I asked if the teachers’ blockades and increased 
presence of law enforcement in the region had given them any trouble en route. She 
answered that when they arrived at the barricades, they simply got off the bus and walked 
-- past the protesters, and right through a line of federal authorities on the other side of 
the blockades. Because the authorities were more concerned with the blockades, she was 
not worried or afraid. A few days later, her brother and son arrived at the shelter and 
shared that their experience had been similar. Her brother said that although traffic was 
stopped up in the Isthmus, the blockades had not been a problem for them. In some places 
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they had to walk or pass through checkpoints, but the federal authorities paid them little 
attention, and even told them to keep safe.  
CONCLUSION 
 
While the teachers’ protests in Oaxaca had bottlenecked commercial traffic and 
drew the attention of state authorities, migrants were able to slip through the blockades 
and checkpoints, switching vehicles if necessary, and even walking off main roads, thus 
creating alternative mappings of mobility through the region. The creative resistance 
taken up by the protestors generated new migration routes that veered off formal paths, 
including away from the Regularización Humanitaria route to state inclusion. Instead of 
becoming visible to the state through this administrative process, many migrants chose to 
move invisibly through the margins, keeping off the official map in moments of 
confusion and distraction for the state. Their choice not to pursue the Regularización 
Humanitaria and to instead keep moving north without protections offered by the state 
constitutes the “alternative forms of political action” described by Das and Poole (2004, 
19), and demonstrates one of the ways that creativity persists in the margins.  
At the same time, this choice to pursue alternative paths of mobility also exposes 
the some of the weaknesses in the administration of migrants’ rights under the 2011 
Migration Law and Programa Frontera Sur. Without adequate resources and training for 
the INM and fiscalía officials, the investigation of crimes committed against migrants 
and the processing of migrants’ applications for Regularización Humanitaria will 
continue to be delayed or neglected. Furthermore, the oscillating status of migrants in 
 103 
relation to the state -- evident in mixed encounters with INM officials (ranging from 
assistance to extortion to detention) -- hinders the building of a foundation of trust 
between these actors, and helps to produce a landscape of uncertainty that ultimately 





















Chapter V: Conclusion 
In the previous chapters, I have traced part of the material-discursive process of 
border-making in southern Mexico. Following feminist geopolitical approaches to state 
ethnography, this analysis moves across scales to expose points of intersection, 
connection and contradiction between official state narratives as well as migrants’ 
accounts of their embodied movement throughout the Mexican territory. Using both 
critical discourse analysis and ethnographic methods, this examination of both central and 
peripheral narratives of migration enforcement allows for a fuller understanding of how 
borders are materially and discursively made, moving between the highly visible, 
“official” framings of Programa Frontera Sur and the 2011 Migration Law, as well as 
migrants’ and advocates’ lived experience navigating a shifting and uncertain border 
landscape.  
Although the sites of border production differ significantly, themes pivoting 
around visibility and legibility are present in both the political discourse surrounding the 
production of border infrastructure as well as in migrants’ encounters with the state 
during their journeys north. On the one hand, the state performs itself to be seen as a 
protector of human rights -- in some cases in contradistinction to the anti-immigrant 
image of the U.S.; on the other hand, the state is experienced as an institution that, 
although visible, is often illegible to migrants attempting to navigate its administrative 
borders. In order to better illuminate processes rendered opaque by the state, migrant 
advocates have stretched their time and resources to make the state legible to migrants 
attempting to proceed through administrative routes for obtaining legal protections. 
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However, because the state often inconsistently enforces their rights, many migrants opt 
not to claim protections legally afforded to them and continue their journeys through 
alternate routes.  
While this thesis points to a correlation between the multiple agendas of 
Programa Frontera Sur and the confusion produced for migrants attempting to exercise 
their rights and access to programs such as the Regularización Humanitaria, it does not 
claim that there is a simple or direct relation between them. Future investigation might 
draw further parallels between the diverging agendas laid out in Programa Frontera Sur, 
which prioritizes development, securitization and surveillance as well as respect 
migrants’ rights, and the inadequacy and inaccessibility of the services intended for the 
protection of migrants within the Mexican territory.   
Although this thesis does analyze the official discourse surrounding border 
enforcement in southern Mexico, it does not examine the embodied experiences and 
perspectives of government officials in administrative or security-oriented roles. As 
indicated in Chapter Three of this thesis, the embodied and individual experiences of 
government officials, their relationships with migrant advocates and increasing 
knowledge of the plight of migrants seeking legal protections within the state, have 
impacted their attitudes towards Regularización applicants. In alignment with both 
Mountz’s and Latour’s theoretical claims, this thesis acknowledges that everyday 
encounters and activity are not merely nested within or below state policies. Rather, the 
state is materially situated and embodied, connected horizontally rather than 
hierarchically to those who navigate through it. In order to better understand how far-
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reaching and multi-purpose policy programs such as Programa Frontera Sur are 
understood and implemented within particular government institutions (such as the 
branch of the INM in charge of administering Regularización Humanitaria), future 
research might be conducted from within the agency, interviewing government officials 
as well as the migrants who access their services in order to better understand how state 
agendas are interpreted and executed internally. 
Following the work of Das and Poole, this thesis is an ethnography of the state 
from the perspective of the margins. It juxtaposes official state narratives, exhibited 
before national and international audiences, with the narratives embodied by migrants 
moving through the southern border region. It observes how marginality overlaps -- how 
migrants’ journeys are coincidentally impacted by local responses to state repression and 
control -- and how alternative geographies are produced through the intersection of these 
zones of precarity and exception. Despite state attempts to “order” what it describes as a 
chaotic border landscape, creativity in the margins persists, both within the albergues and 
throughout the marginalized region of southern Mexico: in some instances, the local 
protesters’ disruption of state and commercial activities generated new opportunities for 
migrants’ mobility.  
More work might be conducted to investigate potential room for strengthened 
alliances between populations perpetually kept in the margins of the state (as well as the 
interlocking systems of global trade and governance). Chapter Four found overlap 
between the inadvertent impact of protesters in Oaxaca pushing back against neoliberal 
reforms -- ranging from education to increasing energy-sector development -- and the 
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mobility of displaced Central American migrants moving through southern Mexico. 
However, in my conversations with local non-profit leaders and activists in Oaxaca, few 
connections were made between the struggles of both communities. While the 
securitization of Mexico through programs such as the Mérida Initiative was often 
perceived as a means to repress and control domestic resistance groups, such as the 
CNTE teacher protestors, its impact on migrants traveling through Mexico was seldom 
discussed.  
As investigated by Paley in her book Drug War Capitalism (2014), many of the 
people fleeing Central America and migrating north have been displaced, in part, due to 
foreign land acquisition, the inability of local farmers to compete with international 
markets, and rising violence as domestic inequality increases. The similar marginalized 
positioning of these disparate groups relative to the state and their correlated 
displacement through neoliberal development initiatives might be more fully fleshed out 
in future research and activist initiatives. 
Alliances need to be strengthened not only between demographics overlapping 
regionally, but also across borders, bringing greater awareness to the ways U.S. anti-
immigration objectives are carried out globally, in collaboration with other states like 
Mexico and in synchronicity with other first-world nations, such as those in Western 
Europe. In discussing my fieldwork with U.S. citizens, I have found that few of them 
have heard about U.S. participation in border enforcement in southern Mexico, and fewer 
still have heard of similar efforts beyond North America. Much attention has been 
(rightfully) focused on the construction of a wall at the southern border of the United 
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States, but this largely symbolic anti-immigrant project needs to be interpreted in relation 




During my fieldwork, discussions of then-presidential candidate Donald Trump’s 
potential impact on migration were already prevalent. One migrant advocate asked 
several people staying at the shelter why they wanted to continue their journey north, 
knowing the increasingly hostility and visible anti-immigrant sentiment brewing on the 
northern side of the U.S.-Mexico border. One man said that under President Obama, their 
situation was not much better: many had hoped that he would support an immigration 
reform that would benefit them and their families; instead, under Obama’s tenure as 
president, they had seen how migration became increasingly difficult and dangerous. 
Could it be any worse under Trump?  
In reflecting on this perspective, I am inclined to agree that in some ways, 
Trump’s policies will be a continuance of Obama’s understated yet hard-lined approach 
to border enforcement. However, Trump’s theatrical, overtly racist and xenophobic calls 
for a “Muslim ban” and rallying chants to “build that wall” have generated a new border 
narrative, distinct from the image of humanitarian concern cultivated by President 
Obama, with distinct consequences. This narrative has already had an impact on 
migration from Central America and through Mexico: after the election of Donald Trump 
to the U.S. presidency, I was informed that rumors had spread along migration 
recruitment routes encouraging people to migrate sooner rather than later, before 
 109 
increased security at the U.S. southern border would make it impassable. While it is 
probable that new patterns in migration will emerge in correspondence with the new 
administration’s policies, most advocates are certain that migration will continue -- just 
as it has continued despite strict border enforcement under Programa Frontera Sur -- 
whether a wall is built or not. 
 Upon concluding this thesis project, I have debated what steps to take next. 
Throughout my research, I have continued to question how my positionality as a U.S. 
citizen, born and raised in Texas, might be best leveraged to advocate for migrants’ 
rights, especially as ICE-raids and state laws requiring police and immigration 
collaboration proliferate in Texas. Upon voicing these considerations to one of my 
informants in Oaxaca, I was urged to continue paying attention to the situation of 
migrants in Mexico, no matter the turns my future research takes. I have taken this advice 
to mean that U.S.-based research and activism, whether focused on the situation of 
migration in the U.S. or abroad, should attempt to trace threads of accountability and 
consequence between international actors, at local and global scales. The possible 
impacts of Trump’s immigration policies will reverberate far beyond our national borders 
and it will be crucial to remain engaged with advocates, activists and scholars working 
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